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ABSTRACT
The broad aim of this dissertation is to explain some puzzling phenomena in Finance and
Macroeconomics, focusing on the role of (1) government guarantee, (2) Inflation-Linked
Bonds (ILBs) and (3) models with ambiguity and learning. I explore their quantitative
and qualitative influences on consumption, investment and financing decisions.
The first chapter analyzes the effect of government guarantee cost as a new incentive
to issue ILBs. During a political decision or reform process, a government typically has to
provide some form of compensation to avoid noncompliance. The cost of this guarantee
could be significant, and issuing ILBs instead of providing this guarantee would be a way for
the government to avoid this cost. The model with this new feature provides a mechanism
to explain why some countries issue ILBs with low inflation and also justifies why countries
typically only issue small amounts of ILBs compared to nominal bonds, neither of which
practices is well explained by the previous literature.
The second chapter introduces ambiguity and learning into a portfolio-choice model to
explain some puzzling stylized facts, especially the hump-shaped share in risky asset in
relation to age. I find that the ambiguity over labor income will make the agent not invest
much in risky assets at the beginning of the working life. As the agent approaches retire-
ment, there are two partially offsetting effects. First, the learning mechanism gradually
solves the uncertainty. Second, the value of the bond position implicit in his human capital
decreases. Eventually, this second effect prevails, and hence explains the hump-shaped
v
stock allocation of the agents life-cycle profile.
The third chapter discusses the role of ILBs in Chinas pension reform. Firstly it
reviews the current problems of Chinas pension structure so as to find ways to improve the
conditions of Chinese pensioners. In particular, I argue that the government could issue
ILBs. Then by conducting a simulation using Chinas macro and financial data, I show
that the ILBs will provide the investor with a significantly better risk-return trade-o↵.
vi
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Chapter 1
Concerns about Debt Service and Government Guarantee: Revisiting 
the Inflation Issue
1.1 Introduction
Over the last half century or so, finance academics have increasingly proposed the issuance
of Inflation-Linked Bonds (ILBs),1 instruments that provide a safe asset in a “real” sense,
and that perfectly protect purchasing power for the long-term investor. James Tobin (1963)
made one of the most convincing arguments in favor of inflation-indexed debt on behalf of
households:
“. . .markets do not provide, at any price, a riskless way of accumulating purchasing
power for the future, whether for old age, or for college education or for heirs. . . .Meanwhile
we force savers to take risk, even if they would gladly pay for the privilege of avoiding
it. . . ..No private institution can fill this gap. No insurance company or pension fund could
assume the risk of o↵ering purchasing power escalation to its creditors without similarly
(inflation) escalated securities in which to invest at least some of their funds.”
The “modern era” of ILBs started with the issue of UK index-linked Gilts in 1981,2
and over the last couple of decades, more than 20 countries have introduced ILBs (see
Figure 1). The most recent include Denmark (2012), India (2013), and the Philippines
(forthcoming).
1Hereafter, I will call these bonds ILBs. Sometimes I also use indexed bonds or real debt. All these
notations are equivalent in this paper.
2Some countries have issued ILBs earlier, such as Brazil (1964), Israel (1955) and Argentina (1972). The
documented earliest ILBs were issued by the State of Massachusetts in 1790.
2There is a large literature discussing the advantages of ILBs, including completing finan-
cial markets, extracting information regarding expected inflation, lowering future inflation
expectations, the cost of debt financing, and so forth. Both lowering inflation expectations
and the cost of debt financing have been considered as the main incentives for governments
to issue ILBs.3 However, it seems puzzling that a lot of countries have not yet decided to
issue ILBs.4 Obviously a careful analysis needs to be conducted on the incentives and dis-
incentives of issuing ILBs versus nominal bonds. Next, I will briefly discuss the incentives
and disincentives of ILBs versus nominal bonds as well as the related literature. Empirical
findings for these (dis)incentives will be discussed in Section 1.3.1.
Figure 1: Countries Issuing ILBs(1991-2013)5
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Source: Campbell et al. (1996), Price (1997), Garcia et al. (2007), Campbell et al.
3For more general details about ILBs, see two excellent summaries by Campbell and Shiller (1996) and
Campbell, Shiller, and Viceira (2009).
4A related “puzzle” is why the private financial sector rarely either provides this asset class or recom-
mends it to their customers. The most plausible explanation is that the low volatility of ILBs is not favored
by the finance industry. This is also confirmed by several financial professionals including fixed income fund
managers.
5See Table 6 in Appendix A for complete country information.
3(2009), and author’s own collection.
Table 1: Incentives and Disincentives for Issuing ILBs
Incentive Disincentive
Lowering cost of debt financing and inflation expectation
Losing option of using surprise inflation
(Bright side) hedging negative fiscal shock
(Dark side) repudiating debt
Completing financial market
Extracting information of expected inflation
Avoiding potential government guarantee cost
1.1.1 Main Incentives for Issuing ILBs
1.1.1.1 Avoiding Government Guarantee cost
I first refer to this incentive since it has not been considered by previous literature and is
one of the main contributions of this paper. This proposed incentive is based on empirical
findings. Typically when facing political pressures in some structural change or reform,
a government has to provide some form of government guarantee to ease the pressure,
a guarantee which could be very costly.6 Hence, sometimes the government issues ILBs
instead, and thus avoids the potential government guarantee cost they would have to pay
otherwise.7 In this paper, I show that this incentive plays a significant role in explaining
the timing of ILB issuance and why only small amounts of ILBs are issued compared to
nominal bonds. A good example is what happens during the transition from the traditional
pay-as-you-go Defined-Benefit (DB) to a fully-funded Defined-Contribution (DC), during
which a main issue is that the contributor will bear all the investment risk. In order to
gain support and avoid the evasion/non-compliance problem during this transition, the
government generally gives an individual some form of compensation as an incentive to
move to the new DC system. A typical compensation is the nominal return guarantee on
6Hence, the government guarantee cost issue is actually a two-fold concern: whether the government
will neglect this o↵-balance-sheet item and whether this cost could be correctly calculated.
7In Section 1.3.1, I will discuss in detail how this incentive is supported by the observed facts.
4the DC portfolio,8 such as that instituted in Belgium, Hungary, Poland, and Switzerland.9
Alternatively, some countries choose to issue ILBs (see Table 7 in Appendix A).10 Pennacchi
(1999) proposes a method to value such government guarantees by using contingent claim
analysis. Smetters (2002) provides the quantitative results on the unfunded government
guarantee cost during the DB to DC transition, in which he shows that this cost in the
new system could be very high and render the transition from an unfunded to a funded
system meaningless. Lucas and McDonald (2006, 2009) analyze the government guarantee
cost of government-sponsored enterprises (GSE). They argue that the government might
have underestimated the guarantee cost, which is an important reason that the financial
crisis has deepened. My research on government guarantee in this paper is more related to
Pennacchi (1999) and Smetters (2002).11
1.1.1.2 Lowering Cost of Debt Financing and Future Inflation Expectation
Issuing nominal bonds only will lead to incentive problems since people will worry about
debt repudiation through surprise inflation. Hence, lenders will charge an inflation risk
premium which increases the government’s borrowing cost. Issuing real debt will eliminate
this cost. Also ILBs will lower the future inflation expectations since their presence reduces
the incentive for the government to inflate in order to collect seigniorage revenues (see
Campbell and Shiller 1996, Roush, Dudley, and Ezer 2008, and Campbell, Shiller, and
Viceira 2009). Although the results of this literature are arguably best interpreted as
more supportive of this incentive, it is fair to say that this literature has not produced
an unequivocal verdict. Recent research by Fleckenstein, Longsta↵ and Lustig (2013)
8The only documented country to provide real guarantee during this transition is Uruguay, which guar-
antees a minimum annual real rate of return of 2%.
9See Bodie and Merton (1993) for a discussion on pension guarantees.
10Empirical findings in the real world show that, during the transition from DB to DC, the government
typically either provides the nominal guarantee or gives the individual access to the indexed bonds. To the
best of my knowledge, no country has provided both at the same time, which would seem too generous from
the perspective of government. Also, some countries switch between these two policies, and I will discuss
how this interesting phenomenon can be explained by the model.
11The government guarantee literature is not limited to social security privatization or GSE as discussed
here. There is also literature discussing government guarantee during an economic/banking/currency crisis
(see Moore 1997).
5develop an arbitrage strategy to show that the (nominal) Treasury bonds are almost always
overvalued relative to Treasury Inflation Protected Securities (TIPS), and they question
“why US Treasury leaves billions of dollars on the table by issuing securities that are not
as highly valued by the market as nominal Treasury bonds.” Although it is the area of
classical asset pricing theory that their results intend to challenge, it also serves as an
evidence that the current literature cannot well explain why a government chooses to issue
ILBs,12 and the introduction of a government guarantee incentive in this paper is partly
motivated by these findings.
1.1.1.3 Other Incentives
Other main incentives include the role of completing the financial market with a real
risk-free asset and extracting information regarding future expected inflation by the yield
spread between nominal bonds and ILBs (see Price 1997, and D’Amico, Kim, and Wei
2007). Since incomplete market and information are beyond the scope of this paper, these
incentives are not included here but might be included in a future model.
1.1.2 Main Disincentives for Issuing ILBs
1.1.2.1 “Dark Side” Disincentive
Despite the government’s being reluctant to admit it publicly, the reason why the over-
whelming majority of bonds are issued in nominal rather than real term is closely related
to the option of diluting the real value of debt, or, more bluntly speaking, debt repudiation.
This is related to the literature on the (partial) default on sovereign debt through generating
inflation. Calvo (1988) studies a model in which debt repudiation is possible either openly
or through inflation. He shows cases in which the existence of government bonds gener-
ates multiple equilibria. Cole, Dow, and English (1995) consider two types of government
and analyze Perfect Bayesian Equilibria in which lenders’ actions are supported by beliefs
12Some scholars also discuss the liquidity premium of ILBs, which o↵sets the advantage of saving the cost
due to the inflation risk premium (see Roush 2007, and Shen 2009).
6about the borrower’s type. Grossman and Van Huyck (1988) discuss default by classify-
ing sovereign debt default into two kinds: excusable default (for example, due to hedging
the negative fiscal shock) and non-excusable (for example, pure debt repudiation).13 This
disincentive is also considered as the Achilles’ heel for the literature, proposing that the
government should issue ILBs without taking this point into consideration.
1.1.2.2 “Bright Side” Disincentive
Barro (1979) develops a theory of “optimal” public finance and proposes that the gov-
ernment should use debt to smooth distortionary taxation over time.14 Lucas and Stokey
(1983) show that in the environment without capital, the government will have an incentive
to inflate away its nominal liabilities, unless the government could avoid all distortionary
tax, or prices are predetermined. Since neither assumption seems realistic, this paper is
considered as an evidence that issuing indexed debts is the dominant strategy over issuing
nominal debt.15 Instead, Bohn (1988) argues that nominal debt, rather than real debt,
should be used for that purpose In his study, he shows that default through inflation on
nominal bonds will improve the welfare in the environment with regard to distortionary
tax and discretionary policy. The intuition is that if the debt is nominal, then the govern-
ment could realize capital gains through high inflation in bad states where the gains are
very valuable. Bohn’s paper is the first one to provide bright-side justification for nom-
inal bonds. Alfaro and Kanczuk (2006) analyze the e↵ects of this disincentive for ILBs
quantitatively. Diaz-Gimenez et al. (2008) focus on comparing economies with real vs.
nominal debt, with and without commitment, and evaluate the welfare implications of
these di↵erent institutional arrangements. Martin (2009) conducts a positive analysis on
nominal government debt. Similar to Martin’s paper, this paper also considers the case of
a benevolent government that cannot commit to future policy choice. However, in addition
13Also see Calvo and Guidotti (1993) and Kumhof (2004) for discussion on inflation tax.
14Aiyagari et al. (2002) provide a microfoundation for Barro’s model in a general equilibrium framework
with incomplete market.
15Similarly, Barro (1997) discusses the optimal management of nominal and indexed debt assuming the
government has commitment technology; the result suggests little role for nominal bonds.
7to the tools of distortionary tax and inflation on nominal debt, I will also allow government
to use real debt (ILBs) for financing. Further, since I focus on the choice between nominal
and real debt, I consider a government that needs to finance a constant debt, which is an
alternative setting for financing constant expenditure as in Martin (2009).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: The model is introduced in Section 1.2.
Section 1.3 presents the characterization of equilibrium with discussion, comparative statics
and extension of baseline model. Section 1.4 concludes.
1.2 Model
1.2.1 The Economy: a Non-Commitment Problem
The economy consists of a government and a representative individual. These two players
play a stochastic dynamic game. I assume that both government spending and government
guarantee follow an exogenous, stochastic process. Unlike a Ramsey solution such as Chari
and Kehoe (1993) discuss, I consider the case in which government cannot get access to
the commitment technology. The nominal liability will be a source of time-inconsistency
since government will have incentive to inflate away some nominal liabilities. Hence, it is
di cult to convince people that government will keep its promise on the inflation target,
especially during a period of high government expenditures, such as war. I assume the real
level of total debt to be constant, which means debt cannot be used to smooth taxes. As
Martin (2009) points out, the government debt over GDP displays a mean-reversion patten
which suggests the existence of a stable long-run level of debt over GDP. Accordingly, a
government could only use distortionary labor tax and surprise inflation to balance the
budget. Finally, I assume there is no access to lump-sum tax. Under this framework, I
consider Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) for this problem and in the setup there are
two levels for government spending and government guarantee shocks, high level and low
level, following the Markov process of common knowledge with the transition probabilites
given by
8 g = [
 g 1   g
1   g  g
]
 GR = [
 GR 1   GR
1   GR  GR
]
Specificly, the high-level shock at period t remains at the high level at period t+1
with probability 1    , and transitions to the low level with probability  . Similarly, the
low-level shock at t remains a low level at t+1 with probability 1    , and transitions to
the high level with probability  .
Table 2: Comparison with two other economies:
Pareto Ramsey MPE
Commitment or not Yes Yes No
Lump-tax or not Yes No No
Figure 2 below shows the timing of the game: At the beginning of each period, the
government inherits amounts of nominal and indexed bonds equal to bt 1, dt 1 with the
interest rate of it 1, ⇢t 1. Then, the nature reveals the government expenditure and
guarantee cost levels. After observing these two shocks, the government decides whether to
issue ILBs (dt) and whether to partially default by generating surprise inflation (✓t). Based
on this decision, the individual decides how large of a portion to invest on nominal bonds,
hence how much to charge for next-period nominal bonds, it (the individual will charge
higher it if the government does not issue indexed bonds or he will have a higher inflation
expectation next period), which, in turn, determines the other endogenous variables.
9bt#1%
dt#1%
it#1%
ρt#1%
%%%%%%Gt%
%%%%%GRt%
%Realized%
%
%%θt%
%%bt%
%%dt%
%%τt%%
it%
ρt%
Lt%
ct%
Figure%2:%Timing%for%Dynamic%Game%Each%Period%
Nota%on:(
bt:%amounts%of%nominal%bonds%%%%%%%%%%%%%%dt:%amounts%of%ILBs%
it%:%nominal%interest%rate%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%ρt%:%real%interest%rate%%
Gt%:%government%spending%shock%%%%%%%%%%GRt%:%government%guarantee%shock%%
θt%:%surprise%inflaJon%rate%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%τt:%distorJonary%labor%tax%%
ρt%:%real%interest%rate%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%ρt%:%real%interest%rate%%
Lt%:%labor%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%ct%:%consumpJon%
%
%
%%%t% %%%%%t+1%
1.2.1.1 Government’s Problem
The government’s problem is to finance exogenous government expenditures in the least
distortionary manner. A key assumption in this paper is that the government has no access
to the lump-sum tax.
U = E
1X
t=1
 tu(ct , Lt)
St : gt + (1 + ⇢t 1)dt 1 +
pt 1
pt
(1 + it 1)
Bt 1
pt 1
+ 1{dt=0}GRt = ⌧twtLt + bt + dt (1)
10
where
pt
pt 1
= (1 + ⇡t)(1 + ✓t), bt =
Bt
pt
, u(ct , Lt) = ct   !1 L
1+1/!2
t
1 + 1/!2
1{dt=0} is an indicator function which equals 1 if dt 6= 0 and equals 0 if dt = 0. The
characteristic of an indicator function plays an important role to explain why a government
only issues small amounts of ILBs compared to nominal bonds. In addition to the notations
in Figure 2 above, pt is the price level, the inflation
pt
pt 1 consists of two parts, the regular
inflation rate, ⇡t , and surprise inflation ✓t. Bt is the nominal value of nominal bonds.
1.2.1.2 Individual’s Problem
U = E
1X
t=1
 tu(ct , Lt)
St : ct + It + bt + dt =
(1  ⌧t)wtLt +MPt ⇤ kt + (1 + ⇢t 1)dt 1 + pt 1
pt
(1 + it 1)
Bt 1
pt 1
+ 1{dt=0}GRt (2)
where u(ct , Lt) = ct   !1 L
1+1/!2
t
1 + 1/!2
1{dt=0} is an indicator function which equals 1 if dt 6= 0 and equals 0 if dt = 0. It is
investment, wt is the real wage, kt is capital and MPt is the marginal product of capital.
!1 and !2 are two parameters representing labor disutility and labor labor intertemporal
elasticity in utility function.
11
1.2.1.3 Optimality Condition
For the individual,
Euler equation for consumption:16
1 + ⇢t = 1/  (3)
Euler equation for labor with competitive firm’s maximization problem:
Lt = [
(1  ⌧t)(1  ↵)k↵
!1
]1/(↵+1/!2) (4)
Nominal interest rate rule17 is:
1 + it = (1 + ⇡
e
t )(1 + ⇢t) (5)
Since this is a leader-follower dynamic game as previously described, the government
will make its optimal choice by taking the optimal strategy of the individual into consider-
ation. Due to the complexity of the government’s problem (leader in this dynamic game)
and discrete-choice setting (for issuing indexed bonds or not), it is impossible to get the
analytical result. The numerical solution will be provided and discussed in the next section.
Considering the limitation of the numerical solution such as the sensitivity to the change of
parameters, the comparative statics are conducted to check whether the numerical solution
is robust to the change of parameters, and furthermore, whether it is consistent with the
basic intuition and matches the stylized facts on the timing of issuing indexed bonds.
16This assumption that consumption enters linearly in the period utility function has the advantage of
simplifying the determination of the equilibrium interest rates without a↵ecting the tax-smoothing motive
of the model.
17To make this model solvable, I will feed into the nominal interest rate rule by making the nominal
interest rate be a function of the inflation expectation and real interest rate. The inflation expectation will
increase with surprise inflation rate and decrease with the amounts of ILBs. Empirical findings show the
inflation expectation is more sensitive to the issuance of ILBs (see Campbell and Shiller 1996, Campbell,
Shiller and Viceira 2009).
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1.2.2 Definition of Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE)
As described above, this model is a non-commitment stochastic dynamic game where the
two random shocks evolve according to the Markov process of common knowledge, so I
restrict my attention to the Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE).
The state of economy is {gt, GRt, bt 1, dt 1}. Given the state of economy, I could write
the government’s problem recursively as
V (gt, GRt, bt 1, dt 1) =Max{✓t,bt,dt}[u(ct , Lt) +   ⇤ EV (gt+1, GRt+1, bt, dt)]
A Markov perfect equilibrium is a set of state variables, a value function V and a policy
function {✓t, bt, dt}, such that given the state of the economy, {✓t, bt, dt} solve the govern-
ment’s problem above. Note that in this leader-follower dynamic game, the government
optimizes its problem by taking into consideration the optimal response of the individual.
In other words, given the individual’s strategy and the state, the government maximizes
utility. Also given the government’s strategy and the state, the private sector optimally
chooses its labor choice, consumption, etc. Notice that since I feed into the interest rate
rule so this is a partial equilibrium framework rather than a general equilibrium framework,
this is also why I do not need to consider the market clearing condition of bond markets.
This is a necessary setting for the model to be solvable.
1.3 Quantitative Analysis
1.3.1 Empirical Findings
1.3.1.1 ILBs and Potential Government Guarantee
It has been argued that ILBs should serve as an important asset class in pension manage-
ment. The aversion to inflation risk of pensioners is expected to rise as time goes on. In the
event that an individual loses part of his or her financial assets (in real terms) at a mature
age, it would be more di cult to find ways (such as finding a job) to compensate for that
13
loss in real income. If aversion to inflation is dependent on the ability to find a job (i.e.,
use one’s human capital as a hedge), then aversion to inflation should rise with age. As
an illustration, suppose a typical pensioner at age 60 is expected to live for approximately
20 more years, and with an average inflation rate of 2% over that period, this pensioner
receiving a nominal annuity would see his or her income lose one-third of its value over this
period. If he or she could live to be 100 years old, more than half of the real purchasing
power of his or her annuity would have evaporated. Hence, ILBs are of particular interest
to the pensioner in the DC system since keeping purchasing power is the main objective
for pension investment.18
Table 3: Timing of ILBs and Potential Government Guarantee19
Country ILBs Issue Year DB to DC Transition Year
Austria 2003 2002
Australia 1985 1985
Australia 1993 1992
Belgium 2004 2003
Denmark 2012 2011
Hungary 1996 1998
Germany 2006 2004
India 2013 2009
Japan 2004 2001
Mexico 1999 1997
Poland 1992 1991
Sweden 1994 1994
UK 1975 1975
Source: OECD Data Lab, IMF World Economic Outlook
As Table 3 shows, quite a few countries have introduced the DC system and ILBs in the
same period, which accounts for 46% of the total cases of ILBs’ issuance. Hence, it is hard to
interpret this as a coincidence of time. Also some governments make ILBs only accessible
to pensioners/individuals rather than institutional investors. Huang (2013) conducts a
18For investment and inflation issues in social security, see Bodie (1995, 2001) and Abel (2001a, 2001b).
19See Appendix A for complete information.
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case study in Hong Kong’s iBond program. A total of 155,835 valid applications from
individuals were received for over 13 billion HK dollars (about 1.669 billion U.S. dollars)
in the principal amount for the bonds, which exceeded the planned issue amount of 10
billion HK dollars. Among all the valid applications for the iBond, those who have applied
for 44 units (HK$10,000 for one unit) or less will be allocated the full amount applied for,
and there are 150,869 such applications. In addition, there are 4,966 valid applications
that have applied for more than 44 units. Each of them will be allocated 44 units first,
and 1,344 of them will be allocated one additional bond unit based on ballot results. The
elderly, retirees and the middle class comprise the majority of iBond subscribers, with an
average subscription amount of HK$70,000 to HK$100,000. The overall subscription rate
was 30%.
1.3.1.2 Inflating Away Nominal Liabilities During Recession
From Figure 1 in Section 1.1, there are two obvious time gaps during which there is no
country issuing ILBs: 2000-2002 and 2008-2010. A common feature with these two periods
is the world-wide recession due to the stock market crash. It is reasonable to conjecture
that the governments need to inflate away some nominal liabilities during the recession and
provide a bu↵er to the economy and budget. Another support is from the relative amounts
of nominal and real debt in the US Treasury bond market. The detrended nominal bonds
and Treasury Inflation Protected Securities (TIPS) reach their peak (trough) and trough
(peak) at the same time during economic recession (boom) (see Figure 3 below).
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Figure 3: US Outstanding Real and Nominal Debt (2000-2012)
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1.3.2 Benchmark Calibration and Numerical Solution
Table 4: Calibrated Parameters
Notation Value Name
  0.95 discount factor
!1 8.71 labor disutility parameter
!2 0.5 labor intertemporal elasticity
↵ 0.33 capital share in Cobb-Douglas
  0.05 depreciation rate
(B +D)/y 0.58 total debt/output
gH/y 0.51 high level government spending over output
gL/y 0.27 low level government spending over output
GRH/y 0.34 high level guarantee cost over output
GRL/y 0.02 low level guarantee cost over output
 g 0.95 government expenditure persistency
 GR 0.95 government guarantee persistency
The first five parameters are taken from the standard business-cycle literature.20 The
20For calibration parameters, see Lucas (2000), Domeij and Floden (2006), Alfaro and Kanczuk (2006),
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total debt, the two levels of both government spending and government expenditure per-
sistency are calibrated using country-specific data from IMF World Economic Outlook.
(This benchmark calibration use the average level of all countries studied in this paper,
and Section 1.3.5 provides the analysis using data country by country). Following con-
vention, after getting the g/y time series, I detrend the series and calculate the mean,
standard deviation and estimate the autoregressive coe cients. See Figure 5 in Appendix
A for country-specific government spending.
For the calibration value of guarantee cost, i.e., GRH/y,  GR , it is di cult to calibrate
these values since no data are available. I temporarily take them as the free parameters
and choose them to match the stylized patterns. Later I will use the Martingale pricing
theory to estimate the guarantee cost and compare that with the calibrated value here.21
Several assumptions are needed to make MPE computable. First I assume the real
level of total debt to be a constant ratio over GDP, which means debt cannot be used
to smooth taxes. As Martin (2009) points out, the government debt over GDP displays
a mean-reversion patten which suggests the existence of a stable long-run level of debt
over GDP. Further, I set capital to be constant. This implies that similar to debt, capital
also cannot be used to smooth taxes. This greatly reduces the calculation burden and is
a necessary step to make equilibrium computable. As Grossman and Han (1999) point
out, this assumption is much less restrictive than it seems. These authors show that,
when government can save after defaulting, contingent debt (or capital) does not allow
for any additional tax smoothing. In contrast, contingent service may engender more tax
smoothing than the one already attained through savings. Grossman and Van Huyck
(1988) and Alfaro and Kanczuk (2006) make a more restrictive assumption by fixing the
real levels of capital, indexed and nominal debt to be constants over time.22 Here I have
and Martin (2009). For the government guarantee cost introduced in this paper, there is no direct data
available. However, as I discuss in Section 1.3.6, a special case of government guarantee could be estimated
by the Martingale pricing theory.
21In Section 1.3.6, as a special case, I will price the government guarantee cost in the scenario of the
transition from the traditional Defined-Benefit to Defined-Contribution system.
22Alternatively, Cole and Kehoe (2000) assume that a risk-neutral household with no access to interna-
tional bonds chooses the level of capital. Hence in their case, debt is used neither for production nor for
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relaxed their assumption by allowing the changing amount of real and nominal debt each
period while keeping the sum unchanged. These assumptions will reduce the number of
state variables to three,{gt, GRt, dt 1}.23 With concerns about multiple equilibria in MPE,
I follow previous literature to set two levels for each exogenous state variable and hence I
consider the discrete-choice problem for each period, There are 8 states in the economy:
State 1: {GRH , gH , no ILBs last period}; State 2: {GRH , gL, no ILBs last period};
State 3: {GRL, gH , no ILBs last period}; State 4: {GRL, gL, no ILBs last period};
State 5: {GRH , gH , ILBs last period}; State 6: {GRH , gL, ILBs last period};
State 7: {GRL, gH , ILBs last period}; State 8: {GRL, gL, ILBs last period},
where “GR” represents guarantee, “g” represents government spending, and subscript “H”
and “L” represent high and low level, respectively.
1.3.3 Equilibrium Characterization and Discussion
Using the benchmark calibration, the equilibrium characterization is as follows:24
Table 5: Equilibrium Characterization
State 1 State 2 State 3 State 4 State 5 State 6 State 7 State 8
dt No Yes No No No Yes No No
✓t Yes No No No Yes No No No
⌧t 0.286 0.109 0.144 0.113 0.29 0.1 0.136 0.105
lt 0.288 0.317 0.311 0.316 0.287 0.318 0.312 0.317
The characteristic of MPE is that the optimal decision will depend only on the payo↵
relevant states (shown above) rather than the whole time history.25 In the baseline model,
the derived MPE indicates that the government will issue ILBs in State 2 and State 6.
smoothing consumption.
23When real level of total debt is constant, once the number of indexed bonds dt 1 is determined, the
number of nominal bonds bt 1 will be fixed.
24A potential concern about MPE is the possibility of multiple equilibria. By a reasonable range of initial
guess about value function, this issue is not found in the numerical calculation. See Calvo (1988) for a
discussion of multiple eqiulibria.
25The detail of algorithm to solve the Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) is provided in Appendix B.
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Both states share the feature of a low government spending level and a high government
guarantee level.
Now with this result, by specifying exogenous shocks of government spending and
guarantee shock for each period in advance, I could simulate a typical time pattern of ILBs
issuance. As Figure 4 shows, in period 1, both government spending and guarantee cost
are on their low level, and there is no incentive to issue ILBs. At period 2, the government
expenditures jump to the high level, the reason for which could be a negative technology or
fiscal shock.26 There is strong disincentive to issue ILBs during this period. At period 3,
the economic condition is still not improved and simultaneously the government announces
the social security privatization plan, i.e., there is a high level government guarantee shock
starting from period 3. Notice that although the government guarantee is high in period
3, the government does not choose to issue ILBs to waive this cost at this period. Instead,
it chooses to generate the surprise inflation. The reason is that the economic condition
is still bad, and government spending level is still high. However, there is no free lunch:
what follows the surprise inflation is the higher inflation expectation, and hence higher
borrowing cost on the nominal bond. Then when the government enters into period 4,
the government-spending level goes back to a low level, which signals the improvement of
the economic situation. Now it is the best timing for the government to issue the ILBs.
In addition, there is no surprise inflation in this period and the nominal interest rate also
decreases due to the lower inflation expectation for the next period. The government will
keep issuing the indexed bonds until it is hit by another high level government spending
shock. This is a typical pattern for some countries that I will discuss below in Section
1.3.5.
26Note that in the production function I do not consider the technology term since it could be “inter-
nalized” into the government expenditure shock. For example, if there is a negative technology shock, the
output will decrease and government expenditure will increase correspondingly, which is also consistent
with the facts.
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Figure 4: A Baseline Time Pattern for ILBs Issuance
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1.3.4 Comparative Statics and Robustness Check
State 1: {GRH , gH , no ILBs last period}; State 2: {GRH , gL, no ILBs last period};
State 3: {GRL, gH , no ILBs last period}; State 4: {GRL, gL, no ILBs last period};
State 5: {GRH , gH , ILBs last period}; State 6: {GRH , gL, ILBs last period};
State 7: {GRL, gH , ILBs last period}; State 8: {GRL, gL, ILBs last period},
In addition to solving the model, the comparative statics are conducted to check the
robustness of the equilibrium. I check the comparative statics with respect to the param-
eters of two levels of government spending and government guarantee, the ratio of total
debt over GDP, the time discount factor, and the number of ILBs (given that the govern-
ment issues them). The result shows that the MPE is robust to the change of parameters.
Here I will list the comparative statics result regarding the change of government guaran-
tee parameters. A “rank” on these 8 states could be constructed to show which state is
more likely to issue the indexed bonds. As Figure 6 in Appendix A shows, when the high
level of government guarantee GRH is low, the government will not issue indexed bonds
in any state, then as GRH increases, the first state to issue the indexed bonds is state 2,
i.e., {2}. The features of state 2 include (a) low level of government spending, (b) high
level of government guarantee cost, and (c) no indexed bonds in the last period (hence the
inflation expectation for this period is high). This result is quite intuitive: The feature
(a) is very clear since if government spending is instead at the high level, the government
will have more pressure on balancing the budget so will tend to use surprise inflation to
finance the government expenditure with the motive of distortionary tax smoothing rather
than issuing ILBs. For (b), holding all else unchanged, the government wants to issue ILBs
since by doing so it could avoid the guarantee cost especially when the guarantee cost is
high, as in the transition from DB to DC. (c) has already been discussed by the previous
literature. As Campbell and Shiller (1996) argue, an important motivation to issue ILBs
21
is to lower the inflation expectation. As the GRH keeps increasing, the set of states in
which the indexed bonds are issued evolves as the following order: {2} ) {2,6} ) {1,2,6}
) {1,2,5,6} ) {1,2,4,5,6}. Then, keeping GRH unchanged, we continue to increase GRL.
As Figure 7 in Appendix A shows, the set of states to issue indexed bonds keeps enlarging:
{1,2,4,5,6} ) {1,2,4,5,6,8} ) {1,2,3,4,5,6,8} ) {1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8}. So the “rank” of states
which are more likely to issue indexed bonds is 2>6>1>5>4>8>3>7. This is consistent
with the intuition. As I discussed before, empirical findings show that a government is
more likely to issue ILBs when (1) the potential guarantee cost is high, (2) government
spending is low, and (3) people have higher inflation expectations. This is exactly what the
rank of states reveals here. Another interesting comparative statics is regarding the change
of the relative ratio of ILBs over nominal bonds. From the data of US Treasury bond and
TIPS market, I set the benchmark ratio to be 8%. Holding all else unchanged, increasing
this ex ante fixed ratio will make a government less likely to issue ILBs in the states where
it chooses to issue ILBs. This provides a justification for why countries typically only issue
small amounts of ILBs compared to nominal bonds. The intuition is clear: the substitution
role of ILBs for government guarantee and the according indicator function set-up in the
budget constraint (1) make government have an incentive to only issue a small rather than
a large amount of ILBs. Of course, this ratio could not be infinitely small since another
role of ILBs, lowering inflation expectation and decreasing financing cost, also has an e↵ect
when a government makes its decision.
1.3.5 Stylized Facts Analysis Country by Country
1.3.5.1 High Prior Inflation, No Government Guarantee Shock
This category includes Mexico (1989), China Mainland (1988,1992),27 Canada (1991), Italy
(1983), and Argentina (1972). During the issuance of ILBs for these countries, there is no
government guarantee shock, and the main motivation of issuing ILBs is the prior high
27Rigorously speaking, what the Chinese government provided in 1988 and 1992 were inflation-indexed
banking savings which could be considered as a substitute for non-marketable ILBs.
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inflation. They issue ILBs in order to lower the future inflation expectation and debt
financing cost for nominal bonds. For Argentina (1972) and Italy (1983), the timing is
more interesting since there is a one- or two-year lag between the year with highest inflation
rate and year of issuing ILBs. The reason is that the economy is in recession when the
inflation hits the peak, so these two countries choose to postpone the issuance of ILBs
when economic conditions improve.
1.3.5.2 High Inflation with Government Guarantee Shock
Several countries fall into the category with high prior inflation and potential government
guarantee cost, such as Chile (1981), Poland (1992), Mexico (1999), and India (2013). In
this scenario, the best strategy is undoubtedly to issue ILBs. However, one thing worth
noting is that the level of government spending is important when a government ponders
the decision to issue ILBs. When the government spending level is high, for example, the
economy is bad, then some will postpone the issuance of ILBs, such as Mexico (1999) and
India (2013) did.
1.3.5.3 Low Inflation with Government Guarantee Shock
The previous literature fails to explain why quite a few countries issue ILBs when there is
no fear of high inflation. Instead, the introduction of concerns about government guarantee
cost could well explain what happened for Australia (1985, 1993), Sweden (1994), Austria
(2003), Belgium (2004), Japan (2004), Germany (2006), HongKong (2011) and Denmark
(2012). When taking a careful look at the countries in Section 1.3.5.2 and 1.3.5.3, we
will find the countries in Section 1.3.5.3 are mainly developed economies, while those in
Section 3.4.2 are mainly less developed. It makes sense since the government guarantee cost
of developed countries is generally higher than that of developing countries. That is why
the developed countries are more likely to issue ILBs during a low inflation environment
when they are hit by a government guarantee shock.
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1.3.5.4 Switch between Issuing ILBs and Providing Nominal Government
Guarantee
The model introduced in this paper could match the most interesting empirical findings:
some countries switch between issuing ILBs and providing a nominal government guarantee
as Figure 4, above, shows. As with Poland, the country was hit by a government guarantee
shock since there was a transition from DB to DC in 1991, and the country was experiencing
the recession (negative GDP growth in 1991). Therefore, Poland announced it would
provide a government guarantee on the DC portfolio, but in 1992, when the economic
condition improved, the government switched back to issuing ILBs since the government
guarantee cost was high and the need to use the nominal bond to collect inflation tax was
less urgent. Similar stories happened in Mexico (1997-1999), Hungary (1996-1998), and
Belgium (2003-2004).
1.3.6 Extension of Baseline Model
1.3.6.1 Extension with Portfolio Choice and Price Government Guarantee in
Scenario of DB to DC Transition
For the baseline model, the government guarantee cost is an exogenous, lump-sum cost
for simplicity. It would be more realistic to endogenize this cost since the guarantee cost
typically depends on an individual’s risk-taking behavior in the DC account. For example,
if the individual invests more on the risky asset, then the guarantee cost on this portfolio
will be higher. A good way to think about it is to model this guarantee cost as a put
option. When the volatility of the underlying asset (here it is money put into the DC
portfolio) increases, the value of the put option (here it is the government guarantee cost)
will be higher. Keeping this in the mind, the individual’s budget constraint will become:
ct+It+bt+dt+eqt = (1 ⌧Lt  ⌧St )wtLt+MPt⇤kt+(1+⇢t 1)dt 1+ pt 1pt (1+it 1)bt 1+
max{pt 1pt (1 + it 1)bt 1 +
pt 1
pt
(1 + ERt)eqt 1 , (pt 1pt bt 1 +
pt 1
pt
eqt 1) ⇤ (1 +NGRt)} (6)
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The last term of the budget constraint represents that the individual will receive the
higher of a DC investment return and a nominal guarantee rate of return.
dt =  t⌧St wtlt ; bt = (1    t)(1   ⌘t)⌧St wtlt ; eqt = (1    t)⌘t⌧St wtlt (the government
decides how much is invested in indexed bonds,and individual choose the allocation between
nominal bonds and stock).
Hence, the government guarantee cost
GRt = max{0, (pt 1
pt
Bt 1
pt 1
+
pt 1
pt
eqt 1) ⇤ (1 +NGRt) 
[
pt 1
pt
(1 + it 1)
Bt 1
pt 1
+
pt 1
pt
eqt 1(1 + ERt)]} (7)
Note that this guarantee value equals zero if the government chooses  t = 1
Proposition 1: The individual will invest all the money on the most risky asset in
the guaranteed DC account. Proof: See Appendix C.
This result is intuitive and this free-rider problem has been discussed by previous lit-
erature, as in Smetters (2002). Proposition 1 will greatly simplify the equilibrium charac-
terization and make the calculation of the government guarantee cost on the DC portfolio
possible.
I use Martingale pricing theory to price the potential government guarantee cost. The
details of the algorithm is provided in Appendix D. The results are provided in Table 9
below.
As Table 9 shows, it would be interesting to compare this estimated guarantee cost with
calibrated cost. The baseline result shows that the guarantee cost calculated by Martingale
pricing theory is generally lower than the calibrated guarantee cost. However, the order
of magnitude is preserved. The possible explanation is that the estimated cost is the
cost from social security privatization, but there could be government guarantee cost from
other sources, such as the financial or political crisis.28 However, I would like to point out
28See Moore (1997) for a discussion of government guarantee cost from other sources.
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that this estimate cost is the sensitivity to the parameters. The change of parameters of
duration of government guarantee n and/or growth rate of wage g might reverse the policy
of issuing ILBs or not. It also leaves room for countries to reconsider their ILB issuance
policy.
Table 9: Comparison between Calibrated and Estimated Guarantee Cost (Percent of
GDP)
Country Calibrated
Estimated,
Baseline Case
n=20, g=0
Estimated,
n=30, g=0
Estimated,
n=20, g=0.03
Austria (2003) 0.43 0.32 0.48 0.54
Australia (1993) 0.42 0.26 0.39 0.44
Belgium (2004) 0.44 0.27 0.41 0.45
Chile (1981) 0.37 0.26 0.39 0.44
Denmark (2012) 0.43 0.31 0.47 0.52
Hungary (1996) 0.33 0.29 0.44 0.49
Germany (2006) 0.42 0.25 0.38 0.42
India (2013) 0.27 0.23 0.35 0.39
Japan (2004) 0.39 0.25 0.38 0.42
Mexico (1999) 0.26 0.22 0.33 0.37
Poland (1992) 0.3 0.23 0.35 0.39
Sweden (1994) 0.44 0.29 0.44 0.49
UK (1975) 0.39 0.19 0.29 0.32
1.4 Conclusion
This paper introduces concerns about government guarantee cost to help a dynamic model
to better match countries’ timing of issuing ILBs. ILBs’ substitution role for government
guarantee provides a mechanism to explain why some countries issue ILBs when there is
no fear of high inflation and why some countries choose to issue ILBs during structural
change or reform such as social security privatization. This also gives an explanation why
countries typically only issue small amounts of ILBs compared to nominal bonds. Finally,
26
the di↵erence between calibrated and estimated government guarantee cost also leaves
room for a government to reconsider the policy of issuing ILBs.
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1.5 Appendix
1.5.1 Appendix 1.A: Tables and Figures
Table 6: Countries issuing ILBs
Country ILBs Issue Year
Argentina 1972
Australia29 1985, 1993
Austria 2003
Belgium 2004
Brazil 1964
Canada 1991
Chile 1981
China (Hong Kong) 2011
China (Mainland)30 1950, 1988, 1992
Denmark 2012
Finland 1945-1968
France 1998
Germany 2006
Greece 2003
Hungary 1996
Iceland 1955
India 2013
Israel 1955
Italy 1983, 2003
Japan 2004
Korea (South) 2007
Mexico 1989, 1999
New Zealand 1977-1984, 1995-1999, 2012
Poland 1992
Sweden 1994
Thailand 2011
Turkey 2007
UK31 1975, 1981
US 1997
29Superannuation system (DC) in Australia was introduced in 1985 and became compulsory in 1992.
30Inflation-linked Banking Deposit was provided in 1950, 1988 and 1992
31Non-marketable ILBs in 1975 and marketable ILBs was first introduced in 1981
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Table 7: ILBs Issuance and DB to DC Transition
Country ILBs Issue Year DB to DC Transition Year
Austria 2003 2002
Australia 1985 1985 (Superannuation system was first introduced)
Australia 1993 1992 (Superannuation system became compulsory)
Belgium 2004 2003
Denmark 2012 2011
Hungary 1996 1998
Germany 2006 2004
India 2013 2009 (NPS)
Japan 2004 Oct, 2001
Mexico 1999 1997
Poland 1992 1991
Sweden 1994 1994 (Legislated)
UK 1975 1975
29
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Table 8: Calibrated Guarantee Cost (Percent of GDP, limited to the countries with
available data)
Country ILBs Year Calibrated Guarantee Cost
Argentina 1972 N/A
Australia 1985,1993 N/A, 42%
Austria 2003 43%
Belgium 2004 44%
Brazil 1964 N/A
Canada 1991 41%
Chile 1981 38%
China (Hong Kong) 2011 32%
China (Mainland) 1950,1988,1992 N/A, 25%, 22%
Denmark 2012 43%
Finland 1945-1968 N/A
France 1998 42%
Germany 2006 42%
Greece 2003 39%
Hungary 1996 33%
Iceland 1955 N/A
India 2013 26%
Israel 1955 N/A
Italy 1983,2003 33%, 43%
Japan 2004 39%
Korea (South) 2007 34%
Mexico 1989,1999 21%, 26%
New Zealand 1977-1984, 1995-1999, 2012 N/A, 37%, 34%
Poland 1992 30%
Sweden 1994 44%
Thailand 2011 29%
Turkey 2007 31%
UK 1975, 1981 N/A, 33%
US 1997 34%
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Figure 6: Comparative Statics (GRH)
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Figure 7: Comparative Statics (GRL)   
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Figure 8: Comparative Statics (gH)
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Figure 9: Comparative Statics (gL)
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Figure 10: Comparative Statics (the ratio of ILBs over nominal bonds)   
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Figure 11: Comparative Statics (discount factor)   
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Figure 12: Comparative Statics (total debt)   
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
State 8: GRL , gL , ILBs last period
Total debt level
IL
Bs
 th
is 
pe
rio
d
38
1.5.2 Appendix 1.B: Numerical Computation
Algorithm of solving MPE: I use value function iteration to solve this discrete-choice model.
Alternatively, the policy function iteration could be conducted with the concern of short-
ening the computation time and double-checking the result. I try both and there is no
significant improvement of computation time for the second approach and the result is the
same.
Step 1 : Calibration the values of parameters from previous literature and data.
Step 2: Define the states of economy (8 states in this case). Specify the reward function
u, the transition probability matrix P.
Step 3: Define the convergence tolerance (I set it as 10ˆ(-6)), the maximum number of
iterations (I set it as 1000) and an initial guess for v(s) for each state s (I set it as zero and
also try di↵erent numbers to check the possibility of multiple equilibria).
Step 4: Update the v(s) for each state s using the Bellman operator defined above,
until the value function in all states converges.
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1.5.3 Appendix 1.C: Proof of Proposition 1
Proof of Proposition 1: In the scenario of a government guarantee on a DC portfolio, there
is no access to ILBs. Then, from the budget constraint (6), in order to maximize the
utility, the individual will maximize the value of potential guarantee government promise
to provide.
Case 1. The nominal guaranteed rate of return NGRt   it, assume that the individual
will put a positive portion x on the riskless bond, then the individual could always decrease
x and increase the portion invested on the risky stock to y such that the sum of these two
terms does not change, but the expected utility will increase. The option value based
on the new portfolio will also be increased. Therefore, a positive number invested in a
non-stock asset can never be optimal, which completes the proof.
Case 2. The nominal guaranteed rate of return NGRt < it, the rate of return o↵ered
by riskless nominal bonds (here since there are no ILBs, it is easier to consider all terms as
nominal rather than real). This case is trickier. In this case, although a rational agent has
incentive to hold bonds, he should hold all the bonds in his non-mandatory portfolio. In
other words, the agent should still hold equity in the guaranteed DC portfolios. An implicit
assumption is that there are no short-sale constraints in the non-mandatory portfolio.
40
1.5.4 Appendix 1.D: Pricing Government Guarantee Costs using Martingale
Pricing Theory
I use the Martingale pricing theory ( or called option-based approach) to value the
government guarantee. 32 The basic idea is that the guarantee can be valued as a put
option. I assume the evolution of instantaneous interest rate of return dS/S is given by:
dSt/St = µtdt+  tdWt (1D)
µt is the expected rate of return for the DC portfolio,  t is the standard deviation for
the rate of return on the portfolio, and dWt is the standard Wiener process. For simplicity,
I assume  t to be a constant and there exists a nominal risk-free asset that pays a nominal
rate of return equal to r. Also I assume a guarantee of a minimum fixed nominal rate of
return equal to m. The current value on a DC portfolio is denoted by S. If this guarantee
starts at date 0 and ends at date ⌧ , then its value can be calculated by the standard
Black-Scholes put option formula with an exercise price X = Sem⌧ . So the value of the
guarantee GR,
GR = Xe r⌧N( d2)  SN( d1) = Sem⌧ r⌧N( d2)  SN( d1)
= S[e(m r)⌧N( d2) N( d1)] ⌘ Sh(⌧) (2D)
where d1 = (r  m+ (1/2) 2⌧/( p⌧) and d2 = d1    p⌧ .
Besides, it is not di cult to calculate the guarantee that begins at some future year y
and lasts for ⌧ periods, since the guarantee value is proportional to S. Denote the current
date as 0 and the current value of this guarantee as GR(0, y, ⌧). Using the risk-neutral
measure approach,33 the value of guarantee could be calculated by
32See Pennacchi (1999), and Lucas et al. (2006) for the details of this approach.
33Under the risk-neutral measure, the expectation is computed under the assumption that the rate of
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GR(0, y, ⌧) = e ryh(⌧)E˜0[S(y)] (3D)
This setting could also be relaxed to incorporate the growth of DC contribution as
well as the multiple-year guarantee. If the nominal growth rate of new contribution is g,
then E˜0[S(y)] = Sery+gy. Substituting this into equation (3D), the guarantee value for the
period y to y + ⌧ at date 0 is
GR(0, y, ⌧) = h(⌧)Segy (4D)
Taking one step further, if this guarantee lasts for n consecutive years, then the guar-
antee value, GRn, is
GRn = Sh(1)
n 1X
y=0
egy (5D)
return on the DC portfolio equals the risk-free rate, that is, µt = r. In this case, E˜0[S(y)] = Se
ry, where S
is the current date 0 value of the DC portfolio.
Chapter 2
Life-Cycle Investment with Ambiguity and Learning
2.1 Introduction
During the last few decades, a bunch of datasets such as Survey of Consumer Finances
(SCF) or Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) have documented a significant increase
in the propensity of households to invest in stock, probably due to the growing prevalence
of defined-contribution plans. Simultaneously, there has been a surge of research interest
in household’s life-cycle financial investment decision problem. However, the existing life-
cycle models seems still not satisfactory, of which the prediction is inconsistent with the
stylized facts. As Figure 1 shows,1 one unsolved puzzle is that the empirical studies from
data show that the share of portfolio invested in risky assets tend to be “hump shape” in
age (See Poterba and Samwick 2001, Ameriks and Zeldes 2001, Faig and Shum 2002).
The early studies such as Merton (1969) and Samuelson (1969) show that a life-cyle
agent should hold a constant fraction of the wealth in the risky asset through his or her
life. Some subsequent studies have tried to reconcile the theory and stylized facts. One
strand is to focus on how the labor income a↵ects the portfolio choice. Early papers such
as Bodie, Merton, and Samuelson (1992) treat the discounted labor income as riskless in-
come, which even reinforce the puzzle since such assumption suggests that the allocation
toward stocks should start high (close to 100%) early in life and decline over a person’s
1Data source: Guiso et al. (2001). “Direct and indirect stockholding” means the shares held directly,
mutual funds, investment accoutns, retirement accounts. “Risky financial assets” means direct and indirect
stockholding, plus corporate, foreign and mortgage-backed bonds.
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age as human capital depreciates. Some researches use micro data to calibrate the indi-
vidual labor income process, such as Campbell et al. (2001). But only (counterfactually)
high correlations between shock to labor income and stock return can explain why the
young people hold such a low portion of risky assets. Some other models have to resort to
some assumptions such as high participation costs in stock, etc, which also seems not quite
substantial (See Abel 2001a, Vissing-Jorgensen 2002, Cocco, Gomez, and Maenhout 2005,
Gomes and Michaelides 2005, Alan 2006 ). In addition, even if some qualitative evidence
could be provided to some degree, but the quantitative match is quite poor (See Campbell
et al. 2001). Benzoni, Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein (2007) impose a cointegration rela-
tionship between aggregate labor income and aggregate dividends on market portfolio and
find that such a relation leads to a large reduction in optimal stock holdings for a typical
risk-averse investors. By modelling human capital as risky asset, they find that the optimal
portfolio choice for the young investor is to take a substantial short position in the risky
portfolio, in sharp contrast to much of the previous literature.
More recently, another strand of literature has looked for explanations from non-
standard preference, some of which also combine the learning mechanism. More specif-
ically, this strand of literature is mainly on applications of ambiguity aversion preferences
to the study of the portfolio choice problem. The earlier study on this literature typically
applied either the multiple-prior approach or robust control approach (See Epstein, Wang
1994, Anderson, Hansen, and Sargent 2003, and Boyle, Garlappi, Uppal, and Wang 2010),
but do not introduce learning. Epstein and Schneider (2007) build a model in which ambi-
guity (on the mean stock return) can be reduced over time through learning. Campanale
(2011) also applies this theoretical framework to quantitatively rationalize the moderate
stock market participation rates.
44
Figure 1: Life-Cycle Profile of Risky Assets Holdings (US Data)
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In this paper, we build a dynamic model in which an investor is concerned about
ambiguity over labor income and averse to the model uncertainty. Regarding the model
framework, the closest paper is Campanale (2011), of which the main focus is on partici-
pation rate rather than the portfolio choice in this paper. 2 Relative to Campanale (2011)
who uses multiple-priors utility model, we use the generalized recursive ambiguity utility
model. As discussed in Ju and Miao (2012), this is a generalized utility model which in-
cludes some other models of ambiguity as special cases, e.g., the recursive utility model
of Epstein and Zin (1989), the recursive smooth ambiguity model of Klibano↵, Marinacci,
and Mukerji (2009), the recursive multiple-priors model of Epstein and Schneider (2003),
Campanale (2011), as well as the robust control model of Hansen and Sargent (2007).
Another di↵erence between our paper and Campanale (2011) is that we introduce am-
biguity and learning on labor income instead of stock return. Including Campanale (2011),
there has been some previous paper considering the ambiguity on stock return, which moves
a step in the right direction towards matching the empirically observed pattern. Consid-
ering both the nature and the significance of future flow of labor income in the life-cycle
portfolio framework, it is reasonable to consider people could perceive labor income process
to be ambiguous. And to the best of our knowledge, no paper has yet considered ambi-
guity on labor income. Hence it makes our exploration towards this direction potentially
meaningful and interesting in this field.
For labor income process, we adopt the “heterogeneous income profiles” (HIP) process,3
departing from the traditional “restricted income profiles” (RIP) process.4 Guvenen (2007)
points out that a potential important reason why the RIP setting has been overwhelmingly
used given the weak empirical support from labor income data is that this process could
generate the consumption behavior consistent with stylized facts (See Deaton and Paxson
2In addition to the stock market participation rate, Campanale (2011) also tries to simulate the condi-
tional shares but is unable to generate hump-shaped age-portfolio profile.
3The HIP refers to a labor income process, in which individuals are subject to shocks with modest persis-
tence while facing life-cycle profiles that are individual-specific and vary significantly across the population.
4The RIP refers to a labor income process, in which individuals are subject to large and very persisetnt
shocks while facing similar life-cycle income profiles.
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1994). Considering there was no relevant study of the economic agent’s behavior when
he or she faces the HIP process, Guvenen (2007) fills this gap and study the life-cycle
consumption behavior, and compare the e↵ects of two labor income settings. Guvenen
(2007) shows that these two models display some similaries. In addition, HIP performs
better in explaining substantial risk in consumption inequality over the life cycle, and
generates steeper consumption profiles for people with higher education, neither of which
are generated by RIP model.
By adding the features described above, our model is able to create hump-shaped
portfolio holdings in relation to age. As we will discuss in detail later, introducing learning
plays the key role in the success to explain this stylized fact. The mechanism is intuitive:
when there exists ambiguity over labor income, the future flow of labor is better described
as risky in contrast to the riskless asset assumed by many of previous literature. Hence
the agent will not invest so much in risky assets at the beginning of a working life. As the
agent approaches retirement, there are two partially o↵setting e↵ects. First, the learning
mechanism gradually solves the uncertainty and leads human capital to take on more
riskless features. Second, the residual value of future labor income shrinks, since the agent
has fewer years left to work, and therefore the value of the bond position implicit in his
human capital decreases. Eventually, this second e↵ect prevails, and hence explains the
hump-shaped stock allocation of his or her life-cycle profile.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 presents the description of the
model. Section 2.3 conducts calibration, main findings of analysis as well as robustness
check. Section 2.4 concludes.
2.2 Model
2.2.1 Utility
The standard rational expectation model assume the investor have an intertemporally
additive expected utility function . The implicit assumption behind this setting is that the
47
agent know which model is the correct model. However, many argue that this assumption
is too strong. That is the motivation to introduce ambiguity into the model. Intuitively,
the consideration of ambiguity will drastically reduces the demand for the risk asset. That
is why this utility class has successfully explained the high risk premium puzzle.
Suppose the agent is not sure whether he is picking up the right model, it is natural he
would also consider all the other alternative models. We need to give a framework how the
agent compare all the possible models. Here, we assume the agent has ambiguity over the
probability distribution on state space S. This uncertainty is described by an unobservable
parameter z in the space Z.
The agent has a prior µ0 over the parameter z. Each parameter z gives a probability
distribution ⇡z over the full state space. The posterior µt and the conditional likelihood
can be obtained by Bayes’ learning mechanism.
We consider the following recursive ambiguity utility function: 5
Vt(C) = [C
1 ⇢
t +  {v 1Eµtv   u 1E⇡z,t [u(Vt+1(C))]}1 ⇢]
1
1 ⇢ , VT+1 = 0 (1)
and u and v are given by
u(c) = c
1  
1   ,   > 0 and   6= 1, (2)
v(c) = c
1 ⌘
1 ⌘ ,   > 0 and   6= 1, (3)
u and v are increasing functions and µ is a subjective prior over the set
Q
of probability
measures on S, which follows the literature standard.   2 (0, 1) is the subjective discount
factor, 1/⇢ is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, and   and ⌘ are the coe cients
of constant relative risk aversion and ambiguity aversion, respectively. For illustration
purposes, we define   = v   u 1, then attitudes towards ambiguity are characterized by
the function form of  , while attitudes towards risk are characterized by the function form
5See Klibano↵, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005), Ju and Miao (2012) for this utility class.
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of u.6 Ambiguity is characterized by properties of the subjective set of measures
Q
. The
agent displays risk aversion if and only if u is concave, while he reveals ambiguity aversion
if and only if   is concave. Intuitively, an ambiguity-averse agent prefers consumption plan
that is more robust to the potential variation in probabilities. This distribution represents
the uncertainty about the ex ante utility evaluation of C, E⇡u(C) for all ⇡ 2
Q
. When  
is in linear form, the agent is ambiguity neutral and the smooth ambiguity utiliy function
reduces to the standard expected utility function. If   = ⌘, then the agent is ambiguity
neutral and (3) reduces to the standard Epstein-Zin utility model. In this case, the posterior
µt and the likelihood distribution ⇡z,t can be reduced to a predictive distribution, which is
the key idea underlying the Bayesian analysis. The agent is ambiguity averse if and only if
  < ⌘. Hence, this model achieves a separation between ambiguity and ambiguity aversion.
If we take a snapshot at one period, the utility setting with ambiguity preferences over
consumption is shown as below:
v 1
 R
⇧ v   u 1
 R
S u(C)d⇡
 
dµ(⇡)
 
, 8C : S ! R+ (4)
If the agent’s ambiguity aversion goes to infinity, (1) is reduced to the recursive multiple-
priors model of Epstein and Schneider (2007):
Vt(C) = min
z
[C1 ⇢t +  E⇡z,t [V
1  
t+1 (Ct+1)]
1
1   ]
1
1 ⇢ (5)
Finally, the utility function defined in (1) is also connected with robust control , as
studied by Hansen and Sargent (2007). Specifically, the agent recognizes the possibility of
model misspecification and accounts for it in his decision. Our framework could be consid-
ered as a special case of taking considertaion of model misspecification, since in the general
robust control framework, we need not restrict model misspecification to uncertainty re-
6This setting is ordinally equivalent to the smooth ambiguity model of Klibano↵, Marinacci, and Mukerji
(2005):
R
⇧
 
 R
S
u(C)d⇡
 
dµ(⇡) ⌘ Eµ (E⇡u(C)). They adopt the power-exponential specification to model
the feature of ambiguity aversion.
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garding a particular parameter. The agent knows the distribution ⇡z for each possible
model. The agent is ambiguous about which is the right model specification and he has a
subjective prior µ0 over alternative models .
2.2.2 Labor Income Process
In the year before retirement t  T1, I assume the investor i’s log labor income is given by:
yi,t = ↵i +  it+ zi,t (6)
zi,t =  zi,t 1 + ui,t (7)
where  i is the individual specific labor income growth rate with variance  2  , ui,t is the
innovation to the AR(1) process.
Following Guvenen (2007), the labor income process we consider here is “heterogeneous
income profiles” (HIP) process, where individuals are subject to shocks with modest per-
sistence while facing life-cycle profiles that are individual-specific and vary significantly
across the population (that is   is significantly less than 1 and  2  is large). An alter-
native setting is called “restricted income profiles” (RIP) process, individuals are subject
to large and very persistent shocks while facing similar life-cycle income profiles (i.e.,  
is close to 1 and  2  is zero). We choose the first one because of two reasons: (1) there
are more empirical evidence from labor income data in favor of HIP; (2) The consumption
behavior generated in response to the HIP process is consistent with important empirical
facts such as within-cohort consumption inequality over the life cyle and the consumption
growth parallels income growth over the life cycle. As Guvenen (2007) discusses, the fit to
consumption data from HIP is much better than that of RIP.
2.2.3 The Kalman Filtering Learning
In line with the standard literature, the stochastic component of income is modeled as
an AR(1) process plus a purely transitory shock. The process for log earnings, yi,t, of
individual i who is t years old is given by
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yi,t = ↵i +  it+ zi,t+"i,t (8)
zi,t =  zi,t 1 + ui,t (9)
zi,0 = 0 (10)
We assume that ↵i is known and  i is distributed across individuals with zero mean,
and variances of  2↵. For the innovations ut and "t, we assume them to be with zero mean,
and variances of  2u and  
2
" , and also independent of each other and over time.
We assume the agent is ambiguous about his labor income growth rate  . To embed
the learning process into a life-cycle model, we need to be specific about what individual
knows about  . So we assume there is some prior belief about his income growth. This
prior could incorporate some relevant information unavailable to the econometrican. A
rational agent will refine these initial beliefs over time by incorporating the information
revealed by subsequent series of labor income realizations. We introduce Kalman filter
learning into the model. An important step is that we need to specify which components
of income are observable. We assume that individuals observe only total income,yi,t, and
not its components separately. As Guvenen (2007) discusses, if both yi,t and the stochastic
component, zi,t + "i,t, were observable, then individual’s income growth rate   would be
revealed in just one period.
In this standard Kalman learning framework,the “state equation” describes the evolu-
tion of the vector of state variables that is unobserved by the agent:
264  i
zi,t+1
375
| {z }
Si,t+1
=
264 1 0
0  
375
| {z }
F
264  i
zi,t
375
| {z }
Si,t
+
264 0
ui,t+1
375
| {z }
 i,t+1
(11)
Equation (11) expresses the observed log labor income as a linear function of the un-
derlying hidden state and a transitory innovation:
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yi,t = ↵i + [t 1]
264  i
zi,t
375+ "i,t = ↵i +H 0tSi,t + "i,t (12)
Both shocks are assumed to be i.i.d. Gaussian distribution and are independent of each
other. The covariance matrix of  i,t and the variance "i,t are denoted by Q and R respec-
tively. The prior belief over ( i, zi,1) is modeled by a multivariate Normal Distribution
with mean Sˆi,1|0 ⌘ ( ˆi,1|0, zˆi,1|0) and variance-covariance matrix:
P1|0 =
264  2 ,1|0 0
0  2z,1|0
375 (13)
The agent’s belief about the unobserved state vector Si,t has a normal posterior distri-
bution with a mean vector Sˆi,t|t and covariance matrix Pt|t. Sˆi,t+1|t and Pt+1|t denote the
one-period-ahead forecasts of these two variables and their evolutions via Kalman learning
are given by
Sˆi,t|t = Sˆi,t|t 1 + Pt|t 1Ht[H
0
tPt|t 1Ht +R] 1 ⇤ (yi,t  H 0t Sˆi,t|t 1) (14)
Sˆi,t+1|t = FSˆi,t|t (15)
Pt|t = Pt|t 1   Pt|t 1Ht[H 0tPt|t 1Ht +R] 1 ⇤H 0tPt|t 1 (16)
Pt+1|t = FPt|tF
0
+Q (17)
As a characteristic of Kalman filter learning, the posterior variance of  i is monotoni-
cally decreasing over time, hence, the belief on  i become more concentrated around the
true values after each new observation.7 Finally, the conditional labor income based on
the updated belief is normally distributed:
yi,t+1|Sˆi,t|t ⇠ ↵i +N(H 0t+1Sˆi,+1|t, H 0t+1Pt+1|tHt+1 +R) (18)
7This could be shown from equation (16) mathematically.
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2.2.4 Financial Market
Without loss of generality, we assume the agent could invest two assets : a riskless bond
with real return Rf , and a risky stock with real return Rt. The excess return return on
the risky asset, Rt+1  Rf , is given by
Rt+1  Rf = µ+ ⌘t+1 (19)
where the innovation ⌘t+1, is assumed to be i.i.d. and normally distributed with zero
mean and variance  2⌘. We allow innovations to excess returns to be correlated with in-
novations to the shock to labor income ut, and the correlation coe cient is denoted by
⇢⌘u.
There is a mandatory social security system for retirement. During working life the
individual must save a fraction ✓ of the current labor income into the system for retirement.
Hence the disposable labor income is given by
ydi,t = (1  ✓)yi,t (20), for t  T1
During working life, the individual cannot consume or borrow against the money which
has been put into social security system. As age T1 retirement wealth is converted into
a riskless annuity, so that the individual receives the annuity value corresponding to WRi,t
in each of retirement years. We assume that the individual is forced to hold retirement
wealth in riskless assets, which is typical for social security systems.8
2.2.5 Liquid Wealth and Individual Constraints
We denote cash on hand in period t by
8Previous literature also considers the scenario in which retirement wealth could be invested in risky
assets. See Campbell et al. (2001)
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Xi,t =Wi,t + (1  ✓) ⇤ yi,t (21)
Wi,t represents liquid wealth of investor i at date t. Liquid holdings of bonds and stocks
are denoted by Bi,t and Si,t respectively. We impose non-negative consumption, borrowing
and short-sales constraints:
Ci,t   0 (22)
Bi,t   0 (23)
Si,t   0 (24)
The timing for each period of a household’s working life (t  T1) is as follows: the
investor starts the period with liquid wealth Wi,t and retirement wealth WRi,t . Then labor
income yi,t is realized. The choice variables include consumption and asset allocation
between risky and riskless assets. We let  i,t denote the portfolio share of the risky asset.
Next-period liquid and retirement wealth are then given by
Wi,t+1 = [1 +  i,tRt+1 + (1   i,t)Rf ][Wi,t + (1  ✓) ⇤ yi,t   Ci,t] (25)
WRi,t+1 = [1 +Rf ][W
R
i,t + ✓ ⇤ yi,t] (26)
After retirement(t > T1), retirement wealth no longer accumulates. Instead, it provides
riskless annuity A(WRi,s). After-tax labor income (1  ✓) ⇤ yi,t in the above two formulas is
now replaced by A(WRi,s).
2.2.6 The Individual’s Optimization Problem
The individual’s problem is to maximize the recursive ambiguity utility subject to all
constraints discussed above during working-life and retirement phase. The control variables
are Ci,t and  i,t at each date t. The state variables are time t, cash on hand (Xi,t),
retirement wealthWRi,t , and the last period’s forecast of the true state in the current period,
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Sˆt|t 1. The problem is to solve for the policy rules as functions of the state variables. Note
during retirement, pension income is constant and there is source for neither uncertainty
nor learning, so the problem will simplify significantly.
This problem cannot be solved analytically, and we will resort to standard numerical
methods for the dynamic optimization. We use backward induction method for this finite-
periold problem and discretize the state-space and choice variables to address the continious
variable issue. The Gaussian quadrature is used to calculate the expectation operator. The
details of algorithm has been provided in the appendix.
2.3 Calibration
Now we describe the parameterization of this life-cycle model and it is summarized in Table
1 below. Individuals enter the labor market at age 20, retire at 65 and die at 80. We set the
discount factor to be 0.96. For the recursive ambiguity preference parameters ⇢,  , and ⌘,
we set ⇢ = 0.5,   = 5, ⌘ = 80 as benchmark parameter, following Chen, Ju and Miao (2013).
For benchmark intercept and growth rate of wage, we set ↵ = 1.5 and   = 0.012.9 The
other HIP process parameters are also taken from Guvenen (2007), including the variance
of income growth rate ( 2  = 0.00038) , the autocorrelation coe cient of the stochastic
component of income, zi,t (  = 0.82) , the variance of innovation to zi,t ( 2u = 0.025) , the
variance of purely transitory shock to income is ( 2" = 0.032). In addition, the following
parameters are taken from the standard portfolio-choice literature: riskless real interest
rate r = 2%, equity risk premium µ = 4%, standard deviation of innovations to risky asset
 2⌘ = 0.157, correlation between income and stock return shock ⇢⌘u = 0.516, and the social
security tax rate ✓ = 0.1.
Also we assume that individuals could only observe the total income yt and stochastic
component (zt + "t) is unobservable. The motivation behind this assumption is that if the
stochastic component (zt + "t) were also observable, then it will only take one period to
9As discussed in Guvenen (2007), the intercept term is a scaling parameter and the growth rate   is set
to the mean growth of log income in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID)
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learn the value of wage growth rate   and there is no further learning after the first period.
Of course, to introduct nontrivial learning, we could allow either zt or "t to be separately
observable. However, there is no good reason why one component is observable and the
other is not.
Table 1: Calibrated Parameters
Notation Value Name
  0.96 discount factor
  5 relative risk aversion
⌘ 80 ambiguity aversion parameter
1/⇢ 2 elasticity of intertemporal substituion
  0.012 benchmark growth rate of labor income
↵ 1.5 intercept of labor income
 2  0.00038 variance of labor growth rate
  0.82 autocorrelation coe cient of zi,t
 2u 0.025 variance of innovation to AR1 process
"2 0.032 variance of purely transitory shock to income
r 0.02 riskless real interest rate
µ 0.04 equity risk premium
 2⌘ 0.157 standard deviation of innovations to risky asset
⇢⌘u 0.516 correlation between income and stock return shock
✓ 0.1 social security tax rate
2.4 Results Analysis and Robustness Check
As Figure 2 in Appendix shows, the share on risky asset starts at a low value and increases
until age 55, after which it goes down and the decrease accelerates after the retirement age
65. Basicallly, the baseline model prediction is in line with data, although the quantitative
match is not perfect, especially after the retirement age. Most importantly, the model
achieves one of the main goals of this paper: to generate the hump-shaped portfolio strategy
over the life-cycle and provide an intuitive mechanism for that, which is not well explained
by previous literature. Figure 3 plots the consumption and labor income, which is the
averaged results of 1000 hourseholds receiving random draws of the stochastic variables.
The model mechanism is described as follows: most previous models attribute riskless-
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ness qualities to the future flow of labor income, which suggests people should invest more
on risky asset when they are young. Here we assume there is uncertainy about the growth
rate of labor income, so the future discounted flow of labor is a uncertain financial source
for individuals. Hence the individuals will not invest too much at the beginning of their
working life (or even want to take a short postion in stock if possible). As the agent ap-
proaches retirement, there are two partially o↵setting e↵ects. First, the learning mechaism
gradually solve the uncertainty and make human capital take on more bond-like features.
Second, as the agent get older, the value of the his human capital decreases. Eventually,
this second e↵ect dominates, which explains why the agent starts to reduce her investment
strategy.
Besides, one thing worth noting is the Kalman filter learning mechanism. We introduce
Kalman filter as learning mechanism, unlike Campanale (2011) which assumes learning
velocity as an exogenous variable10. One concern is that typically Kalman filter learning
will resolve (a large fraction of) prior uncertainty very quickly, but it is not the case for the
baseline model. First, as discussed before, we assume that individuals could only observe
the total income yt and stochastic component (zt + "t) is unobservable. This assumption
will rule out the scenario that the uncertainty will resolve in one period by learning, which
does not make economic sense. Also, there are two more reasons for the slow learning.
The first reason is that the contribution to income from the slope parameter is small when
individual are young.11 The second reason is due to moderate persistence of income shocks
in HIP process.12 For more detailed discussion about learning speed regarding HIP process,
see Guvenen (2007).
Figure 4 in appendix documents the sensitivity of the results to changes in risk aversion
coe cient. As expected, a less risk-averse agent will invest more in risky asset. More
10Specifically, Campanale (2011) specifies three parameters for learning processes: the long run ambiguity,
the initial ambiguity and the learning speed
11This argument could be confirmed when we adjust the relative contribution between intercept and slope
parameter for robustness check in the following section.
12Guvenen (2007) shows that the speed of learning is not a monotone function of persistence: as  
increases up to 0.85, the learning speed slows down but then speeds up again. In particular, learning is
fastest when the income shock follows a unit root process.
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importantly, compared to the baseline case, the portfolio-choice patterns over the life cycle
do not change qualitatively with di↵erent degrees of risk aversion.
How the life-cycle portfolio choice changes with ambiguity aversion is shown in Figure
5 in appendix. The more ambiguity-averse agent will invest less in risky asset, especially
at the earlier age when there is greater uncertainty. As learning from past wage resolves
the uncertainty, the behavior will get closer to the baseline model.
As shown in Figure 6 in appendix, the patterns of risky asset holding over di↵erent levels
of wealth is perhaps one of the most interesting findings. We use the level of intercept of
income to measure the wealth since it is simple and intuitive. In addition, we try to
compare people with di↵erent wealth levels since the beginning of their working life and
there is no uncertainy about this.13 In this setting, there is no uncertainy about wealth
level and the portfolio choice will di↵er since the first year of working life. At the first year
of working life, the wealthier people will invest more in risky asset. The intuition is clear:
they have more discounted cash flow and they know this without any uncertainty. This
means they have more “bond-like” future cash flow, and they intend to invest more risky
asset now. Also, the more wealthy people will learn faster than the less wealthy people,
since the contribution to income from the slope parameter is larger. In addition, faster
learning will make the more wealthy people reach peak allocation in risky asset at the
earlier age than the less wealthy people.
2.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have studied the implications of ambiguity and learning in a life-cycle
portfolio choice model with labor income following a HIP process. The model is able to
generate hump-shaped investment behavior over the life-cycle. Also another contribution
is that we use Kalman filter learning mechanism so we do not need to resort to exogenous
learning speed or initial ambiguity used by previous literature. One limitation is that the
13That is why we do not use the di↵erent level of income growth rate or other measure to represent
how “wealthy” individuals are, which will greatly complicate the analysis and add di culty in providing
intuitive explanation,
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model prediction of shares in risky asset after retirement drop much quickly than what
is revealed in the data. This limitation is due to the nature of this model, which splits
the life span into two stages: working life and retirement life. In addition, it would be
interesting to augument this model with other economic decisions, such as labor supply
and retirement decision.
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2.6 Appendix
2.6.1 Appendix 2.A: Figures
Figure 2: Data Vs Baseline Model
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Figure 3: Average Consumption and Labor Income
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Figure 4: Di↵erent Degrees of Risk Aversion (  = 2, 5, 10)
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Figure 5: Di↵erent Degrees of Ambiguity Aversion (⌘ = 60, 80, 100 )
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Figure 6: Di↵erent Levels of Wealth (↵ = 0.3, 1.5, 5)
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2.6.2 Appendix 2.B: Numerical Computation
The problem could only be solved numerically. We use the standard backward induction
method to solve this finite-period dynamic optimization and comptute by discretizing the
state variables and the choice variables. For expectation operation, we compute by using
Gaussian quadrature method (i.e., using Gaussian quadrature to approximate the distribu-
tions of innovations to labor income and the return of risky asset, See Tauchen and Hussey
1991). Then the decision rules are computed from the agent’s dynamic programming prob-
lem. In the last period T, the investor consumes all the wealth: Ct = Wt, there is no
portfolio choice. In every period prior to T, and for each possible combination of state
variables, we compute the value associated with each level of consumption and conditional
share on risky asset. This value is the sum of current-period utility and the discounted
continuation value. For the points which do not lie on the grid, we use cubic spline inter-
polation. Following standard method, the combinations of the choice variables which are
not allowed by constraints are assigned a very large negative value to ensure they are never
optimal. Repeat the above procedure until we reach t=0.
After the decision rules are determined, simulation are conducted to compute the life-
cyle profles for 1000 random draws of the stochastic variables and the simulation is repeated
for 50 times and the results are the average of these 50 repetitions. Increasing grid points
or number of random draws does not change the result much.
Chapter 3
China’s Pension Reform and Inflation-Linked Bonds 
3.1 Introduction
Due to the e↵ects of the “one-child” policy, an aging population has become a more serious
problem for China. Accordingly, problems associated with the current Chinese pension
system have drawn increasing attention in recent years. There is little doubt that the
original Pay-As-You-Go (PAYGO) system is financially unsustainable. Following other
countries facing similar problems, China is trying to switch from a PAYGO Defined Benefit
(DB) system to fully funded Defined Contribution (DC) system. But doing so will give
rise to a new problem: Workers will have to bear all the investment risk in the new system.
Furthermore, distorted incentives in the system have led to the failure of previous pension
reforms. Recently, many have come out proposing new pension reforms to address these
pressing questions.
In this paper, I will argue that the government could issue Inflation-Linked Bonds
(ILBs), which can reduce the investment risks and provide important protection against
inflation — the main concern for pension investment. Although there are no such assets
in China mainland, it is noticeable that Hong Kong has already issued ILBs in July 2011.
Besides, drawing on the lessons of Chile’s pension reform thirty years ago, indexed bonds
(called recognition bonds in Chile) might also provide better incentives to manage the
pension system transition. I find, with the help of this kind of bonds, Chile conducted a
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successful pension reform in 1980s since it boosted people’s confidence on government and
hence on that pension reform. Case studies of Hong Kong and Chile in this paper will help
to understand the impact of inflation-linked bonds on China.
There will be three parts in this chapter as shown below: Section 3.1 provides a com-
prehensive review of China’s current pension structure, problems, and possible proposals.
Section 3.2 first analyzes the benefits of indexed bonds from international experiences. A
case study of Hong Kong’s newly issued index bonds follows. The paper then presents an
empirical study using the Chinese Mainland’s actual macro and finance data. The paper
focuses on whether ILBs could improve the investment risk-return tradeo↵. In other words,
it examines whether ILBs could reduce investment risk and achieve target retirement in-
come. A case study on Chile is also done from the perspective of incentive mechanism.
Section 3.3 concludes.
3.2 Review of China’s Pension-Reform Structure
3.2.1 Demographic Trend and the Aging Population of China
Table 1: Age structure change of China in the past 10 years
Population by Age China’s Sixth Census (2010) China’s Fifth Census (2000)
0-14 years old 16.60% 22.89%
15-59 years old 70.14% 66.78%
60+ years old 13.26% 10.33%
(Source: China’s Statistical Yearbook, 2010)
The problem of China’s aging population is obvious, and the United Nations in 2010
forecast that this problem would deteriorate over the next few decades (see Table 1 and
Figure 1). Several reasons contribute to this phenomenon, including the steep decline of
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the birth rate since China implemented the one-child policy in the 1980s, the fact that
replacement-level fertility has been occurring since the early 1990s; and the increasing life
expectancy and continually declining mortality rates in middle-aged and elderly people.
China’s demographic dividend will decline after the working-age population, those aged
20 to 60, peaks at around 70% in 2012 to 2015. Some worry that China may have an
insu cient labor force in the future to sustain economic growth. A more imminent issue
is that increasing old-age dependency ratio due to aging population will jeopardize the
current pension system in China (See Figure 2). Noticing the potential problem in the
future, China has initiated series of pension reform since 1980s, which I will discuss in
detail in the next section.
Figure 1: China’s Median Age Projection (2015-2100)
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Figure 2: China’s Old-Age Dependency Ratio Projection (2015-2100)1
3.2.2 Current Chinese Pension System
3.2.2.1 Current Structure
In 1997, China announced that it would deviate from the pure PAYGO system by estab-
lishing fully funded individual pension accounts. Most academic literature refers to this
step as a milestone in China’s pension reform. However, 1997 system largely failed as funds
in most individual accounts were “borrowed” by the government to finance the benefits
payments of the basic pension plan. The Chinese pension system is a three pillar-system
that includes the basic social pooling pension, or mandatory PAYGO benefit; the individ-
ual account, which is a mandatory fully funded contribution; and the voluntary annuity.
• Basic Social Pooling Pension (mandatory, PAYGO, defined benefit)
-Contribution: About 20% of payroll (depending on city), 100% responsibility of employer,
-Benefits: Based on specific formula involving years of contribution, individual average
wage, and social average wage,
1The old-age dependency ratio is the ratio of the population aged 65 years or over to the population
aged 20 to 64. The ratio is presented as number of dependents, per 100 persons of working age (20 to 64).
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-Minimum 15 years of contributions to qualify,
-Indexation rules do not apply, but, since 2006, in practice benefits tend to increase by
10% each year.
• Individual Account (mandatory, “nominally” fully funded, defined contribution)
-Contribution: 8% of individual wages, which are subject to lower and upper bounds, that
is, 60% and 300% of local average wages, 100% responsibility of employee (civil servants,
especially government employees, stay in another pension system, See Caveats below for
more details),
-Benefit: - No clear rule about rate of return on this account,
- “Nominally” fully funded but they are actually mingled with the social pooling pension
and both are managed by local government together,
-By 2009, at least 13 provinces have committed to full funding and prohibited “leakages”
to the social pooling. But due to the heavy fiscal burden of legacy cost,2 they could sustain
this only by depending on the fiscal transfer from the central government. Some of them
have failed in fulfilling their commitment and allowed the leakages from fully funded system
to social pooling again, such as Liaoning Province since four years ago, which was the first
of the 13 provinces to commit to fully funded system.
• Voluntary pension (The main voluntary pension plan is enterprise annuity (EA), which
is a fully funded, defined contribution plan, with complementary individual plans, much
like 401(k) plans in the United States.)
Several Caveats:
• This three-pillar structure constitutes the major accomplishment of China’s pension re-
form and provides a good basis for continuing reform. This reform begins with the urban
worker and does not yet cover workers in rural locations3. The Chinese government places
a priority on pension reform because it relates to the means of production in China. It is
worth noting, however, that this priority has become weaker as mass industrialization oc-
2See Section “Legacy Cost” for more details.
3The rural pension program is designed and operated separately from the urban pension system . See
Leisering et al. (2002) and Chen (2004) for further discussion.
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curs in China (see Leisering et al., 2002). If the Chinese industrialization process continues
its rapid pace in this century, it is likely that most of the population will live in urban areas
at some point in the future (see World Bank 1997). In Jan 17, 2012, China announced
that people living on its towns and cities outnumbered those in the countryside, making it
a predominantly urban nation for the first time in Chinese civilization.
• The basic pension plays a key role not only in redistribution by providing higher re-
placement rates for people with lower incomes but also in reducing poverty and providing
insurance. The basic pension comprises four subcategories:
(a) The Basic Old Age Insurance System (BOAIS), which covers urban workers. The
“Basic Social Pooling Pension” is just one part of the two parts of BOAIS, which also
includes individual accounts.
(b) The rural pension system covers rural workers.
(c) The pension plans of state organizations and public institutions cover public em-
ployees. In this system, the pension benefits are financed by government budgets without
any contribution by workers. Some question whether this policy is fair, especially after
China announced in June 2012 that it was considering deferring the retirement age. Now,
the government is experimenting with including public sector employees4, mainly in the
education and health sectors, in the mandatory urban system.
(d) The Minimum Life Security System,or the urban Dibao,5 covers the individual who
are not covered by (a), (b) or (c). Dibao provides resources to some poor elderly.
By 2008, these three government-sponsored and mandatory pension arrangements -
BOAIS, the rural pension system, and state or organization pension benefits - has covered
approximately 40% of the Chinese labor force. The three plans respectively covered 28.3,
7.2, and 5.2% of the workers. The Dibao system covered those individuals that the other
three plans did not cover (see Impavido et al., 2009).
4The public sector employees mentioned here does not include government employees. In China, the
former is referred as “Shi Ye Dan Wei” and the later is referred as “Gong Wu Yuan”
5Dibao was originally conceived for urban residents but now has also extended to rural residents.
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3.2.2.2 Sources of Funding
There are three main sources of pension fund. The BOAIS represents the largest pool of
assets in the pension system. The establishment of the National Social Security Fund as a
demographic bu↵er has recently increased this pool of assets. The more recently established
EA system and the complementary individual voluntary plans have also increased this pool.
(a) BOAIS (Social Pooling and Individual Account):
Social pooling and individual accounts now make up the largest pool of pension funds
in the Chinese pension system. O cial figures for 2008 (see Impavido et al., 2009) reported
RMB 993.1 billion in total assets at the national level. In addition, approximately RMB
120 billion has been accumulated in the individual accounts in the 13 provinces that are
working with fully funded system of individual accounts. Of this total, NSSF managed
RMB 33 billion in 2008.6 Provinces, cities, and counties managed the other RMB 960.4
billion. Data on how much the individual accounts in the provinces other than those 13
provinces have accumulated are not publicly available.
(b) NSSF
The NSSF was established in 2000 as a national long-term strategic reserve fund to
meet the future pension obligations of the BOAIS. The NSSF has a dual role as bu↵er in
response to the expected peak of the Chinese demographic transition around 2030 and as a
reserve fund for pension expenditures in case the BOAIS is unsustainable. Funding sources
of NSSF include: (1) capital derived from reduction or transfer of state-owned shares; (2)
fiscal allocation of the central government; (3) allocation from the lottery-based public
welfare fund; (4) capital raised in other manners with approval of the State Council; and
(5) investment proceeds and equity assets. The concentration of the NSSF sources of funds
has decreased in the past few years, with the share of proceeds from initial public o↵erings
(IPO) and lotteries increasing from 20% in 2001 to more than 50% in 2006.
6To improve standards by centralizing the fund, the NSSF manages the central government’s fiscal
transfers to nine of theses 13 provinces. The provinces do not need to pay NSSF the management fee,
which the Ministry of Finance (MOF) budget covers. I will discuss NSSF in detail in the following section.
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By the end of 2011, the total asset of the NSSF had reached RMB 868.8 billion.
Notwithstanding the rapid growth, the Chinese NSSF is still smaller than that of reserve
funds in other countries, such as Canada, Norway, Ireland, and New Zealand. Some has
proposed that the government should put more funds into NSSF or a similar organization
for more e cient fund management (see Zheng, 2011).
By regulation, Chinese state-owned enterprises must contribute 10% of their IPO pro-
ceeds to the NSSF at the time of their public o↵erings. As Bodie and Merton (1992)
point out, it might be the best strategy to give shares of privatized SOEs to pension fund.
First, selling shares of SOEs provides the Chinese government a financing channel for the
transition cost of pension reform. Second, this transfer could minimize disruptions that
large-scale privatization would otherwise cause. (Under ordinary circumstances, it might
be di cult for the stock market to absorb large blocks of new stock.) Furthermore, it will
improve the corporate management. From the international experiences, pension funds
have played an important role in monitoring the management of the companies they invest
in.
(c) Enterprise Annuity (EA)
The third main funding resource of the Chinese pension system is from the EA system.
Hinz (2007) provides a comprehensive introduction for EA system in China.
The EA system is relatively new, but it has already grown considerably, especially in
the recent several years. According to Zheng (2011), by the end of 2006, 24,000 Chinese
enterprises have EA systems, covering 9.64 million employees. By the end of 2010, this
number had increased to 37,100 enterprises covering 13.35 million employees. During the
same period, the total assets in EA increased to RMB 280.9 billion (2010) from RMB 91
billion (2006).
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3.2.3 Problems of China’s Pension system
3.2.3.1 Financing Problems
(a) Legacy Cost
The pensions of workers who retired before 1997, and the accrued pension entitlement
of current workers for employment before 1997 represented China’s “legacy cost/transition
cost.” Workers who retired or who enrolled in the old pension system before 1997 are
entitled to significantly more generous benefits—75 to 80% of wages—than the benefits
under the revised system (58.5%)7. Because the old system was not funded and because
the contribution rates in the revised system’s social pension had a lower replacement rate
than the old system, the transition costs represent an unfunded liability.
The pension reforms that the government has initiated since 1997 have become stuck
in di culties over the legacy costs that the old system provided. O cial estimates of the
size of this unfunded liability are not available, but an estimate from the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) placed it at 7% of the gross domestic product (GDP) as of 2003.
The actual cost of funding the unfunded liabilities, however, could be higher than this
total if parameters assumed in the plan are realized. For example, the cost could rise if
the replacement rate increases or if life expectancy after retirement turns out to be higher
than the plan assumed.
Many scholars, such as Feldstein (2006) and Dunaway et al. (2007), have suggested
that Chinese government should separate the legacy problem from the problem of setting
up a new pension system.
(b) Empty Individual Accounts
The problem of empty individual accounts relates closely to the legacy-cost problem.
Although the 1997 reform proposed a well-designed multipillar system, it did not address
7As Dunaway et al. (2007) points out, in practice, the e↵ective replacement rate for the transition
generation is estimated to be around 60% (Sin, 2005) or higher (Chen, 2004). Moreover, the ranks of the
transition generation swelled by the early retirement and layo↵s associated with the acceleration of SOE
reform after 1997, with SOEs employment falling by one-third (35 million workers) during 1997 through
2005.
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the problem of how to move from the current PAYGO system to a funded system and how
to finance the legacy obligation. In fact, the government will need to pay not only for the
implicit pension debt it owed to workers and retirees under the old system but also the
borrowed funds from the individual accounts over the past years. Meanwhile, the Chinese
government has not o cially recognized the implicit pension debt and has not made a
formal decision about how to pay for it. As a result of this policy vacuum—and, indeed,
a lack of other legitimate financing sources—many local governments have moved funds
in individual accounts to pay pensions to current retirees, and most individual accounts
are “empty.” This situation has led to the erosion of people’s confidence and, in turn,
noncompliance with and evasion of the pension reform. All of these factors lead to poor
coverage. The Liaoning Pilot Program, which separates social pooling from individual
accounts, addresses this problem. However, this problem does not extend to all of China,
possibly because of local government’s pressure for financing.
(c) Financing Unsustainability
The current pension scheme will most likely be unsustainable in the future because
the legacy costs do not account for much of what is necessary for universal coverage. In
addition to the legacy costs for those who retired or enrolled before 1997, these costs also
include the pensions of current enrollees, and the cost of covering those who currently lack
coverage. Sin (2005) estimates the number as 141% of GDP for 2001, which approximates
US$ 1.6 trillion.
From a long-term perspective, the increasingly rapid aging of the population with an
associated increase in the dependency ratio (the ratio of retirees to workers) will constitute
a serious financial challenge to the pension system. This trend will become a potential
threat to the fiscal sustainability of the central government. In addition to the pressures
from demographic changes, the government owes a large debt to individual accounts. The
Ministry of Labor and Social Security (MOLSS8 ) has estimated that the PAYGO system
8The Ministry of Labor and Social Security (MOLSS) in 2008 merged with the Ministry of Personnel as
the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security (MHRSS).
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borrowed a total of RMB 199 billion from individual accounts in 2000. It is di cult to
finance the transition cost of this action, although the government has taken some steps,
such as selling SOE assets.
Furthermore, the financial di culties of the system coexist with the fact that wage
growth has in recent years outstripped pension growth. From Dunaway et al. (2007),
average wages in China grew by 15% annually from 2000 through 2005 in state-owned units
and 12.5% in the manufacturing sector. In contrast, average (nominal) pensions grew by
8.5% annually. Due to the strong relative growth in wages, the e↵ective replacement rate
decreased from 75% of SOE wages in 2000 to 55% in 2005. On the one hand, the increase
in average wages and, therefore, contributions relative to pension payouts might boost the
finances of the system. On the other hand, the strong growth in wages would require strong
growth in future pensions if the government hopes to achieve the replacement rates in the
revised system.
3.2.3.2 Widespread Noncompliance and Evasion
Noncompliance and evasion have emerged as widespread problems since the 1997 reform.
According to the MHRSS, participating enterprises owed the system RMB 30.2 billion in
social-security payments by the end of 1998. This number rose to RMB 38.3 billion by
November 1999 and further increased to RMB 41.4 billion by the end of June 2000. Ac-
cording to the MHRSS, underreporting in employment and wages is one of the important
reasons for massive pension system deficit in recent years is , which will reduce the pension
contribution (Hu, 2001). For private companies and the self- employed, refusing to partic-
ipate is the main form of noncompliance. These companies usually have a relatively young
work force.
Evasion is the main barrier to expand coverage. According to the objective set by the
State Council in January 1999, all workers in the urban business sector would be included
in the system by the end of June 1999. However, by the end of 1999, the participation rate
expanded from only 50.4% to 55.6%, and, by the end of 2000, the rate reached only 63.4%.
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(Zhao and Xu, 2002)
The major reason behind the noncompliance and evasion is lack of incentives for both
enterprises and individuals in and out of the system. Pension reform places a high burden
on enterprises. According to the State Council’s Document No. 26 (1997), the contribution
rate of enterprises is 20% of total wages. However, the contribution rates of enterprises
in 18 provinces in 1998 amounted to more than the suggested 20% (Liu, 2000). Taking
into account the additional enterprise contribution for health care (6%), unemployment
insurance (2%), work injury insurance (1%), maternity (0.8%), and, housing provident fund
(usually, 5%-10%), the overall contribution by employers is approximately 40% of wages
in most provinces. This serious financial burden weakens enterprises’ competitiveness and
leads to broad contribution evasion (see Ma and Zhai, 2002).
For individuals, the most important disincentive is probably the low and unclear rate of
return on contributions to individual accounts. This problem is largely due to the fact that
the contributions to personal accounts are not invested. Individual accounts are “empty
accounts”9 —money paid into personal accounts is used to pay current pensioners and
thus the accounts become accounting tools, which means it is still a PAYGO system. The
rates of return are determined administratively without a consistent and clear rule. The
government always has incentive to set low rates to reduce future pension obligations.
When the rates of return are lower than the opportunity cost of the capital, it is natural
that people would rather invest the money on their own instead of investing in pension
accounts. Diamond and Barr (2010) suggested there should be clear rule about rate of
return on individual account, i.e., the system should switch from “empty account” to
“notional account”. This approach could be the best one for China over the next five
years, given that the fully funded system is unrealistic in the current situation.
The second disincentive for individuals is the large redistributive social pooling pillar.
9Some scholars consider China’s individual accounts as notional account. However, it is more accurate to
say that individual accounts in China are “empty account” rather than “notional account”. The di↵erence
between empty account and notional account is that the former has no clear rule about what interest rate
should be attributed to accounts (see Diamond and Barr, 2010).
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Most pension models in the world recognize the necessity of a public pillar. Its function is
to guarantee a minimum pension for those unlucky people who “due to factors beyond their
control, will retire early with disabilities, die young and leave dependents, live longer than
average and run out of resources, or earn very low lifetime incomes which are insu cient
to support them both for their working and non-working lives” (James, 1996).
3.2.3.3 Poor Return of Pension Fund
The poor return of pension fund mainly refers to the low return of BOAIS, which is the
largest part of pension pool. It is a widely recognized fact although very little informa-
tion is publicly available on governance and fund management of BOAIS. The govern-
ment—specifically the MHRSS—currently manages the money in BOAIS at the municipal
level. According to regulations, pension funds accumulated in this system can only be
invested in bank deposits and government bonds with the vast majority reported to be
deposited in the banking system. Typically, funds are placed in term deposits but the
situation varies significantly across provinces. Some provinces simply roll over one-year
deposits, while in others more than 75% of funds are placed in term deposits. According to
Trinh (2006), BOAIS are currently invested in government bonds and bank deposits with
average real-yields of 2-3%.
This fund management of BOAIS gives rise to two problems. First having the same
agencies manage both the PAYGO system and the individual accounts permits the transfer
or “leakage” of funds from individual accounts to PAYGO pensions. Second, this kind of
fund management fails to give fund managers proper incentive. If those managers intend
to invest risky portfolio for higher expected return, on the one hand, they could not get
corresponding bonus if the high return is realized, on the other hand, if the fund su↵ers a
big loss, they will be harshly criticized and probably be fired.
In contrast, the return of NSSF which allows the investment on stock market is quite
good. Since the foundation in 2000, the NSSF has achieved an average real annual return
of 7.03 % by 2010.
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Table 2 Historic Investment Performance of NSSF
Year Annual Return of NSSF Annual Inflation in China
2001 1.73% 0.73%
2002 2.59% -0.77%
2003 3.56% 1.17%
2004 2.61% 3.90%
2005 4.16% 1.82%
2006 29.01% 1.47%
2007 43.19% 4.77%
2008 -6.79% 5.90%
2009 16.12% -0.68%
2010 4.23% 3.33%
2011 0.85% 5.50%
8.44% (mean) 2.47% (mean)
(Source: Annual report of the National Council for Social Security Fund, 2001-2011)
Motivated by the sharp di↵erence of return between the basic pension fund and the
NSSF, in Dec 15 2011, Guo Shuqing, the chairman of Chinese Securities Regulatory Com-
mission, proposed the fund from BOAIS plus House Provident Fund (RMB 4 trillion in
total) should be invested into the Chinese stock market. The reason is simple: The original
return was too low and could not beat inflation. Dai Xianglong, the chairman of NSSF,
several days later (Dec 21, 2011) supported this proposal. An important argument is that
the NSSF, which is allowed to invest in the stock market has realized a higher return in the
10 years since its foundation (Table 2). This proposal immediately activated a big debate
in China over whether the basic pension fund should be invested in stock market. Section
3.2.4.2 provides more details about how to more e ciently manage the pension fund.
In addition, the cross-subsidization built into the consolidation of pension pools also
leads to a disincentive to manage the pension fund. If surpluses will be taken away, then
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there is no incentive for a municipality to generate a surplus; if deficits will be paid for by
other municipalities, then there is no incentive to keep the deficits down. If consolidating
the pools becomes inevitable, a rational choice for the management of pools is to spend
the entire surplus and even create deficits before turning the pension fund over to an
upper level for management. There are many ways to reduce the fund balances. They
include reducing collection e↵orts, approving early retirement, and increasing retirement
benefits. Early retirement presents a vivid example of the discretionary behavior of local
governments when facing distorted incentives (see Zhao and Xu 2002 for more details).
3.2.4 Proposals for China’s Pension System
3.2.4.1 Financing Issues
(a) Legacy-Cost Issue
The legacy cost is a big problem in which the 1997 reform has become mired. China
must find extra funding resources to finance this cost of its pension reform. rom the past
experience of other countries, China has four options: issue national, provincial, or local
debt; raise new taxes or use general tax revenue; sell state assets; or issue special lotteries.
For more details about the means of financing legacy cost and comparison (see Wang et al.
2004). Currently, the government prefers to finance the debt by using proceeds from state
asset sales, probably because it is simple and also because China is currently privatizing to
make its enterprises more competitive. Countries such as Chile and Israel have had similar
experiences (see Bodie and Merton, 1992). A conservative estimate places the value of
China’s SOEs assets more than US $1 trillion in 2001 (see James, 2002). Friedman et al.
(2006) argue that China could easily finance its pension debt by selling SOE assets.
Chile’s approach of giving inflation-linked bonds that are redeemable at retirement in
the pension reform 1980s has also been successful (See Section 3.3.5).
(b) Fund Financing
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It is widely accepted that keeping a pure PAYGO system is unrealistic in view of the
country’s demographic outlook. Almost all scholars agree that China’s pension system
should be at least partially funded10. An attempt to establish a fully funded system failed
in 1997, activating a debate over whether it is realistic to hold fully funded individual
accounts, at least in the short run. Feldstein and Leibman (2006) suggest the establishment
of investment-based prefund individual accounts and that there were serious drawbacks to
considering a notional individual account system. First this system is still PAYGO, and it
deviates from the spirit of China’s pension reform in the last decade. Second, it will distort
incentives and force individuals and enterprises into noncompliance and evasion. Third,
an unfunded system, such as a notional defined contribution system, reduces national
savings and, therefore, the size of the economy. In contrast, Diamond and Barr (2010)
suggested that in the short run, i.e., the next five-year plan, China should set up the
existing individual accounts as notional defined contribution accounts, along the lines of
Sweden’s Inkomstpension, which is designed to combine the defined contribution scheme
and the PAYGO system. Two points are worth noting among views on notional individual
accounts: First, the notional individual accounts that most scholars mention and oppose
are, more accurately, empty individual accounts because empty accounts have no clear
interest rate. The notional individual account Diamond and Barr (2010) propose is di↵erent
from the empty individual accounts11 : “in detail each worker has an account in which is
recorded the total of his cumulative contributions over the years, which are credited each
year by the pension authority with an interest rate defined by law. That is, the recorded
accumulation increases each year by the amount of the contributions during the year plus
the product of the notional interest rate and the level of the accumulation at the end of
the previous year.” (Diamond and Barr, 2010)
Second, Diamond and Barr do not oppose the fully funded system in the long run. They
10However, the opinions on the degree of funding vary among scholars. Some think it should be reformed
as fully funded as soon as possible (see Feldstein and Leibman, 2006).
11The term “notional individual accounts” used by many other scholars is in fact the empty individual
accounts.
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supported the notional individual account because the fully funded individual accounts were
not realistic in the short run, given China’s current economic and social circumstances. The
1997 reform introduced individual accounts as part of the pension reforms, with an expec-
tation of full funding, but failed. The pilot of Liaoning Province and 12 other provinces,
which is considered as the second try to build fully-fund individual accounts, failed again
two years ago. Unless the government can provide correct incentives for individual, the
fully fund system seems not to be a practical concern at least for now. This notional indi-
vidual account allows for gradual evolution into a mix of funded and notional accounts, as
Sweden has, or eventually a pure funded account.
Also, for the financing from social pooling, Feldstein (2006) suggest, instead of using
payroll tax, social pooling should be financed with a broader-based tax, such as the value
added tax (VAT)12. A huge advantage of general tax over a payroll tax is that a general
tax makes evasion and noncompliance more di cult. Another advantage is that it would
permit lower tax rates than possible with the payroll tax. The high payroll tax rate also
drives noncompliance and evasion. Currently, payroll tax administration is ine cient. Tax
evasion has produced a small tax base and high tax rates.
(c) Deferring Retirement
In general, the government could address financial sustainability by increasing the con-
tribution rate, deferring the retirement age, or using both these approaches. On the one
hand, further increasing the contribution rate seems infeasible because the current 28%
contribution rate is high and has led to evasion and noncompliance. On the other hand,
the mandatory retirement age in China is currently 60 for men, 50 for women, and 55 for
women in civil service. This retirement age is earlier than that of most other countries,
providing China some room to defer the retirement age. In an attempt to test the waters,
the MHRSS has announced more than once in recent years that it would initiate research
on deferring the retirement age. But the result of an online survey by www.sina.com.cn, the
12Wang et al. (2004) also suggest using a VAT to finance the legacy cost.
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largest and most popular website in China, show that 90% respondents oppose deferring
retirement age. Government employees constitute the only group supporting this deferral,
probably because their contributions are the government’s responsibility. Blue-collar work-
ers are most strongly opposed to this policy. Nevertheless, China will most likely defer the
retirement age, and the only questions remaining are when and how13.
3.2.4.2 How to More E ciently Manage Pension Fund
As Section 3.2.3.3 points out, the BOAIS has a poor rate of return. The fund is now
estimated to be approximately RMB 2 trillion. Since December 2011, several Chinese
government o cials have proposed that the BOAIS fund should be invested in the stock
market because current management cannot guarantee that it can beat inflation. This
proposal is problematic for several reasons.
First, the removal the strict regulation on the pension fund might put this money
into a large amount of risk because of the risky characteristics of stock market itself and
because the Chinese equity market lacks the maturity and stability of its counterparts in
the developed countries, such as the United States and the United Kingdom. Although
the NSSF historically has had a high rate of return, it is questionable whether this rate is
sustainable.
Second, it is hasty to conclude that the only solution for the poor return is a move to
the stock market. The most important objective for a pension fund is to beat inflation.
Hence, a more sensible way is to let the government issue inflation-linked bonds, which
should serve as the benchmark asset for individual/institutional pension investors.
13The main concern for the government is whether to implement voluntary retirement or just to defer
the retirement age, keeping mandatory retirement.
83
3.3 Impact of Inflation-Linked Bonds on the Pension System: Case
Study
3.3.1 Review of Indexed Bonds in the Global Market
A half-century ago, finance academics started to propose the issuance of inflation-link
bonds, which provide safe assets, perfectly protecting the purchasing power for long-term
investors (James Tobin, 1963). The “modern era” of inflation-linked bonds started with
the issuance of UK index-linked Gilts in 1981, followed by Australia (1985, 1993)14, Mexico
(1989), Canada (1991), Poland (1992), Sweden (1994), the Unitied States (1997), France
(1998), Austria (2003), Greece (2003), Belgium (2004), Japan (2004), Germany (2006),
South Korea (2007), Turkey (2007), Hong Kong (2011), Thailand (2011), Denmark (2012),
and India (2013). From both theoretical and practical reviews of international experiences,
the introduction of indexed bonds yields many benefits, even though they might be di cult
to quantify. One thing worth noting is that the finance industry does not favor indexed
bonds. Some investment professionals believe that the main reason is the low volatility
of this asset, which gives institutional investors less opportunity to generate profit. Ironi-
cally, this property could be considered valuable for diversification purpose and a desirable
property for households to do pension investment which have more controllable risks.
One main advantage of indexed bonds is to provide investors with a perfect hedge
against inflation and real interest rate risk. This might be the earliest motivation for the
government to issue Treasury Inflation Protected Securities (TIPS). James Tobin (1963)
made one of the most convincing arguments in favor of inflation indexed debt on behalf of
households:
“. . .markets do not provide, at any price, a riskless way of accumulating purchasing
power for the future, whether for old age, or for college education or for heirs. . . .Meanwhile
we force savers to take risk, even if they would gladly pay for the privilege of avoiding
it. . . ..No private institution can fill this gap. No insurance company or pension fund could
14It was introduced in July 1985, discontinued in 1988, and recommenced in 1993.
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assume the risk of o↵ering purchasing power escalation to its creditors without similarly
(inflation) escalated securities in which to invest at least some of their funds.”
This asset class will complete the financial market by providing individuals a way to
perfectly insure against inflation risk. It enables individual investors to choose how much
inflation risk they want to hold, allowing for a more optimal allocation among investors
with di↵erent risk preferences over inflation. Section 3.3.4 provides a quantitative analysis
of this concept.
Another main advantage is that it is a good source for inferring the expected inflation,
short term real interest rate, and perceived probability of deflation. Surveys such as the
University of Michigan Inflation Expectation Survey and Survey of Professional Forecast-
ers (SPF) are also important sources of information, but these surveys have important
drawbacks. First, there is a lag time between when these surveys are conducted and when
they are available, and they are infrequently updated. Second, and more important, re-
search in the field of behavioral economics suggests that biases due to framing are likely
to make survey measures of long-run inflation expectations unreliable. As Mishkin (2010)
comments in Campbell, Shiller, and Viceira (2009), the problem is that “when survey
measures of short run inflation expectations change, survey measures of long-run inflation
expectations are likely to move with them, even if long-run expectations have not changed.
This might happen because questions about both are asked at the same time, and the
answer to the first question influences (“frames”) the response to the second, resulting in
a spurious co-movement between the two.” Third, reliability about survey measures is also
one reason that it might make more sense to trust expectations measures that are derived
from financial market data. After all, people buying or selling securities are betting their
money on them; they thus have a strong incentive to base their decisions on their true
forecasts. Here, the inflation-indexed bond market provides more reliable information.
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3.3.2 Current Inflation-Protection Strategies in China
To the best of the my knowledge, the existing inflation-protection tools in China are limited
to interest rate subsidies on fixed deposits and Treasury bonds, which the Chinese govern-
ment has provided in 1950, 1988, and 1992-1993. However, these tools are unsatisfactory
for several reasons. First, these tools are implemented “ex post”—that is, after the high
inflation period—and it is unanticipated. It is unknown when the Chinese government will
take this action and how much it will subsidize. So, it does not provide individuals the
same hedge against inflation risk as TIPS does. Second, these ex post tools aggravate the
speculation on Treasury future market. The famous 3.27 Treasury future incident in 1995
is one example of such speculation behaviors. In 1995, due to the high inflation between
1992 and 1994, there was speculation that Chinese government might provide interest rate
subsidies on the Treasury bonds issued on 1992 (with three-year maturity). Guan Jinsheng,
then considered the “godfather of the Chinese bond market,” did not believe the Chinese
government had enough financial resources to subsidize the Treasury bonds. When the
Ministry of Finance increased the T-bond payout, Guan wanted to guard against rising
futures prices. So, within the last 8 minutes of trading on Feb. 25, 1995, his faction shorted
bond futures worth RMB 1,460 billion (approximately US $180 billion), which represented
one-third of China’s GDP in 1994. Guan then threw 7.3 million short contracts onto the
market. Prices were decreased from RMB 155.75 down to RMB 147.4. This “flash crash”
became one of the most famous scandals during the development of Chinese financial mar-
kets, and the trading on treasury futures was suspended later in 1995, not too long after
the market was born in 1993.
Scholars are now proposing that the Chinese government should issue inflation-linked
bonds. As a pilot program, Hong Kong issued these bonds in July 2011.
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3.3.3 Case Study of Hong Kong’s iBond
Although the Chinese government has not yet issued inflation-linked bonds in the main-
land, Hong Kong has recently issued the inflation-linked retail bond (called iBond), which
could become part of a pilot program in China. Although Hong Kong and Mainland China
have di↵erent types of economies, they share several common aspects, especially in indi-
vidual characteristics, such as investment and consumption behavior and risk preference.
Since the United Kingdom transferred sovereignty over Hong Kong to China in 1997, this
phenomenon has been increasingly obvious, possibly due to more interaction and synergy
between these two economies. Hong Kong issued the iBond on July 28, 2011, and listed
on the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong the following day. The o↵ered issue amount is HK
$10 billion. The minimum investment is HK $10,000. The tax-free bond pays the investors
at least one per cent interest every six months and matures in 2014. If inflation is higher
than 1%, the bond will pay a rate linked to the consumer price index (CPI). According to
a spokesman for the Hong Kong government, “Both the total number of applications and
total application amount are at high levels as compared with those for recent retail bond
o↵erings.”
(a) Primary Market of Hong Kong’s iBond
The Hong Kong government has announced the result of the subscription and allocation
of the iBond: a total of 155,835 valid applications were received for more than HK $13
billion (approximately US $1.669 billion) in principal for the bonds, which exceeded the
planned issue amount of HK $10 billion. Of the 150,869 valid applications, those who have
applied for 44 or fewer units (HK $10,000 for one unit) will receive allocations of the full
amount applied for. In addition, 4,966 valid applications exist for more than 44 units.
Each of those will receive an allocation of 44 units first, and 1,344 will receive an allocation
of one additional bond unit based on ballot results. The elderly, retirees, and the middle
class comprise the majority of iBond subscribers, with an average subscription amount of
HK $70,000 to HK $100,000. The oversubscription rate was 30%, which is significantly
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higher than that of other nominal bonds with similar maturities.
(b) Secondary Market of Hong Kong’s iBond
On July 29, 2011 (the second day of the issuance of the iBond and the first day listed
on Stock Exchange of Hong Kong), the iBond closed at a price of HK $106.70 on the
first day of trading, representing as much as 6.7% for those who had invested. The price
has remained HK $106 to HK $108 in the five months since its issuance. Because of the
iBond’s popularity in Hong Kong, it is reasonable to assume that inflation-linked bonds
will be popular in China, as well.
3.3.4 Empirical Study of China Mainland: Role of Inflation-Linked Bonds in
Asset Allocation
This section examines the role of inflation-linked bonds in asset allocation for Mainland
China and will conduct portfolio simulations from Chinese macro and financial data.
3.3.4.1 Data Description
The CPI data (1980-2011)15 is from the IMF. The stock market data uses the Shanghai
Composite Index (1991-2011)16 from DataStream. The asset allocation does not consider
the nominal Treasury bond because because the available data sample is too small (2006-
2011)17. Instead, this paper uses the fixed bank CD (1991-2011) as the proxy of nominal
bond. For the hypothetical inflation-linked bond in China mainland, this paper uses Hong
Kong’s iBond as benchmark, which provides zero real return and perfectly compensates
for the CPI. None of the rate of return series was continuously compounded.
Several caveats of the methodology:
15I use inflation data after China’s economic reform in 1978, which is considered as the beginning of
modernization. As a convention, I drop the first two years (1978 and 1979) to avoid the possible anomaly
at the beginning of any reform.
16Since the Shanghai stock exchange was set up in 1991, there could be concern that the first one or two
years might generate abnormal returns. I consider both cases and find that dropping the first two years’
data (1991 and 1992) does not change the basic result of this paper.
17The main limitation of the small sample (2006-2011) is for calculation of asset return correlations. In
the earlier simulation ignoring this issue, I consider one-year Treasury bill in the asset allocation, and I find
that the inclusion of one-year bill have little impact on the final result for inflation-linked bonds.
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(a) There are two justifications for using bank certificates of deposit (CDs) as proxies
of nominal treasury bonds in China. First, considering that the largest banks are all state-
owned and that the maturities of CDs in China ranges from three months to five years,
no significant di↵erence exists between default premiums of treasury bonds and bank CDs
of similar maturities. Second, due to investment tradition, Chinese people prefer CDs to
nominal Treasury bonds for asset allocation in fixed income.
(b) The results-report section provides the comparison of result for two groups: Group 1
is a two-asset portfolio combining nominal CDs and stock, and Group 2 is also a two-asset
portfolio including indexed bonds and stock. This paper ignores the optimal portfolio,
which combines nominal bonds, real bonds, and stock. The main reason is that it is
trivial to predict that the Sharpe ratio will improve for this case. Before the introduction
of inflation-linked bonds, there are no risk-free assets, so no tangency portfolio exists in
real terms. Beyond this trivial point, it is more meaningful to compare the two groups I
mentioned above.
(c) This paper does not consider the issue of inflation-risk premiums for nominal bonds
or liquidity premiums for indexed bonds. First, as the most feasible and cautious step,
the author suggests the Chinese government to issue I-Saving-Bond-like indexed bonds as
pilot rather than Treasury Inflation-linked Securities (TIPS) as this paper does. According
to some Chinese government o cials in the MOF, Chinese government has been very
cautious about financial innovation since 2008 financial crisis. The U.S. government has
since 1997 issued both I-Saving bonds and TIPS. The key di↵erence is that people can sell
TIPS in secondary markets; hence they contain more risk if the owners do not keep them
until they reach maturity. Although I-Saving bonds only would mean that the Chinese
government would lose some benefits, such as the ability to extract information of expected
inflation, this approach makes sense because the first priority of financial innovation relates
to investment safety. When the fixed income market becomes more mature, the Chinese
government could consider introducing the secondary market for these bonds. Another
point worth noting is that, if the inflation risk premium and the liquidity premium are
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both positive18 , they will weaken the e↵ect of each other. Ideally, if these premiums were
equal, they would cancel out each other’s e↵ect. From the previous literature, the liquidity
premium of indexed bonds dominates the inflation risk premium of nominal bonds. For
example, D’Amico, Kim and Wei (2007) estimated that the liquidity premium in the ten-
year TIPS yield was as large as 200 basis points during the initial period of issuance and
then decreased and fluctuated to less than 50 bp by 2007. Similarly, Pflueger and Viceira
(2012) gave an estimate of 30 bp during normal time and 150 bp during the early years
of TIPS and the financial crisis of 2008 to 2009. Further, Grishchenko and Huang (2011)
estimated the inflation risk premium to be 14-19 bp. In summary, the domination of
liquidity premium over inflation premium means that the extension including these two
risk premiums will make the indexed bonds more. To put it another way, the simulation
result of this paper will be further improved to support the introduction inflation-linked
bonds.
Table 3 Descriptive Statistics of Asset Return
Stock One-year fixed deposit Indexed bonds
Mean 27.74% 4.65% 5.62%
Standard deviation 61.70% 3.23% 6.37%
Table 4 Correlation Matrix for Assets
Stock One-year fixed deposit Indexed bonds
Stock 1.00 0.12 -0.21
One-year fixed deposit 1.00 0.85
Indexed bonds 1.00
3.3.4.2 Simulation Procedure
Step 1: Calculate the mean, standard deviation and correlation among di↵erent assets.
Step 2: Based on the statistics in step 1, randomly generalize the asset return data for 35
18Campbell et al. (2009) point out that the inflation-risk premium could be negative theoretically
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years, the average number of working years in China. Then calculate the Sharpe ratio with
weights on stock and fixed income asset in two scenarios: with and without the hypothet-
ical inflation-linked bonds. This study assume that stock returns are mean-reverting (see
Campbell and Viceira, 1999) Step 3: Repeat Step 2 50,000 times to get the final result.
Step 4: Perform a robustness check.
3.3.4.3 Results and Explanation
As we could see from Table 5 and 6 in appendix, except the portfolio with zero weight on
stock, the portfolios with indexed bonds dominate those of portfolios with nominal bonds
at all levels of weight. The optimal Sharpe ratio with indexed bonds is 0.653, compared
to 0.553 without indexed bonds. One interesting point is that the Sharpe ratio of the
portfolio purely invested in indexed bonds is smaller than that of the portfolio purely
invested in nonindexed bonds. A natural question then arises: why is the optimal Sharpe
ratio with indexed bonds much larger than that of portfolio without indexed bonds? The
intuition is that the return of indexed bonds and stock is negatively correlated, which makes
indexed bonds a good hedge asset, reducing portfolio variance19. Other countries, including
the United States, have experienced similar empirical results, although no satisfactory
explanation for these results has yet arisen.
3.3.4.4 Robustness check
The first step of the robustness check is to vary the data frequency—that is, to convert
the annual data to monthly/quarterly data, of which the data availability is from January
1994 to November 2012.
As tables 8, 9, and 10 in appendix show, for monthly data, the portfolios with hypo-
thetical indexed bonds dominate those of nominal bonds at all levels of weights for 10% to
100%. But the optimal Sharpe ratio with indexed bonds is 0.2629, beating 0.2460 without
19The corresponding two-asset portfolio variance formula  2p = w
2
1 
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2
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2
2 +2w1w2⇢ 1 2 clearly shows
the advantage of having negative correlation, where  , w and ⇢ represent standard deviation, weight, and
correlation, respectively.
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indexed bonds. An interesting finding for the monthly data is that the optimal portfolio in
two scenarios contains no stock. The possible reason is the high volatility of stock in month
frequency compared to those of indexed/nonindexed fixed income asset. In addition, the
previous finding from annual data indicates that the return of indexed bonds and stock
correlates negatively. However, the finding is weak in monthly data, which indicates a
correlation of -0.035 and is insignificant at the 10% level. But the main finding still holds
that the introduction of indexed bonds will significantly improve the risk-return tradeo↵
over that of nominal fixed income asset.
Table 11, 12 and 13 in appendix give the results for quarterly data, which are basically
consistent with the previous result, especially the improvement of Sharpe ratio. Quarterly
data again confirms that stock is not favored for short-term investment due to the high
volatility of short-term stock in China.
(b) Shenzhen Exchange Versus Shanghai Exchange, A Shares Versus B Shares
This empirical study uses the Shanghai Composite Index to calculate to calculate stock
returns, giving rise to two issues. First, there are two stock exchanges: Shanghai and
Shenzhen. Using the Shenzhen Composite Index does not significantly change the result,
which is not surprising because the correlation between the two stock indexes is higher
than 99%. Second, the Shanghai Composite Index combines both A and B shares. The
key distinction is that A shares are denominated in renminbi and B shares are denominated
in foreign currency (US dollars in Shanghai and Hong Kong dollars in Shenzhen). For a
long time, the other main di↵erence between the two, from a regulatory standpoint, was
that the A-share market was closed to foreign investors, whereas the B share market was
open only to foreigners. However, in 2001, the Chinese authorities tried to boost the B
share market by opening it to individual Chinese investors. Also considering the huge size
and volume di↵erences between A and B shares, it is advisable to use Shanghai Composite
index as proxy of stock return.
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3.3.5 Role of Inflation-Linked Bonds in Providing Correct Incentives in Pen-
sion Reform: A Lesson from Chile
One use of the inflation-linked bonds in the pension system is to serve as compensation to
those who choose to switch to the new pension system from the old one. Chile’s pension
reform in 1981 provides an example for that. As two fast-growing economies, China and
Chile have several similarities. Both have implemented deep economic reform since 1980s,
with the similar economic structures of market-oriented economy characterized by a high
level of foreign trade. Interestingly, Chile has also experienced highly volatile inflation,
as China does. An important and perhaps among the key factors leading Chile’s pension
reform success is that Chile issued inflation-protected recognition bonds with the objective
of protecting the benefits of those who transferred from the old system to the new one.
The Chilean government compensated those who decided to switch with inflation-protected
bonds, equal in value to their accrued benefits under the old system. These bonds were
available to all people who had at least 12 months of coverage under the old system in a
60-month period ending October 1980. The amount for people with at least 35 years of
contribution to the old system is 80% of their salary in the last 12 months before July
1979, with CPI indexing from the last month of such wages up to the month of entry into
the new system. The result was then multiplied by an annuity purchase factor (10.35 for
men and 11.36 for women). The bonds would be redeemable at retirement. Some people
believe that the introduction of recognition bonds played a positive role in Chile’s pension
reform (Myers, 1992). The data shows that 90% of Chile’s workers chose to move into the
new system, even though some national trade-union leaders advised against it. This move
is even “faster than Germans moving from East to West after the fall of the Berlin Wall”
(Pinera, 1995).
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3.4 Conclusion
This paper reviews the existing problems and reform proposals for China’s pension system
and discusses the possibility of introducing inflation-linked bonds to China. With the
switch from DB to DC system, one of the main concerns is the corresponding investment
risk. I show that the introduction of indexed bonds will play an important role in pension
asset-liability matching and will improve investment risk-reward tradeo↵. In addition, it
will provide correct incentives in pension reform and also help to develop China’s fixed
income market, which is an important direction of China’s financial reform.
Finally, there could be several future extensions on this paper, including putting the
ongoing privatization of SOEs into this framework, which might produce a kind of synergy
with China’s pension reform. Also due to the incomplete financial market in China, there
is good reason to believe that more financial innovations, such as swaps and tranches, as
well as a broader international diversification, could further improve risk-reward tradeo↵s
for investment in China. Another interesting extension would be to calculate the potential
cost of issuing inflation-linked bonds from the perspective of the government. This issue
seems to be the main barrier for countries that are hesitating to issue indexed bonds.
However, considering the significant unfunded cost of an implicit or explicit government
guarantee, which could be modeled as a put option, during the transition from a DB plan to
a DC plan, issuing inflation-linked bonds may be an attractive alternative to a government
guarantee. It remains to be seen which option is preferable.
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